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Abstract 
This thesis aims to explore why torture, deemed illegitimate by the Western world for more 
than a century, has resurfaced as a topic of debate, and persists despite its formal 
prohibition. It also endeavours to shed light on the main issues involved in the ‘torture 
debate’. To do so, it begins by exploring the history of torture; examining how it has 
developed over time, and how its uses have changed. Next, the thesis provides the context 
in which the modern torture debate exists in; mapping the change in legal and political 
dynamics that occurred in America as a consequence of 9/11 and the Iraq war, and 
analysing how this altered both public and institutional views towards the torture evidenced 
throughout the ensuing ‘war on terror’.  
Following this, the thesis critically examines the international and domestic legal prohibitions 
on torture and considers their effectiveness as a measure for preventing torture, before 
moving onto the main discussion on the justifiability of torture. The debate outlines the main 
moral, legal and practical arguments in favour and against torture with particular focus given 
to the ‘torture memos’, the ‘ticking time-bomb’ hypothetical, and the effects of torture, not 
only on the victim and torturer, but in a wider social and political context too. It is concluded 
that torture, despite its ineffectiveness and moral reprehensibility, will continue to be 
practised in response to events such as 9/11, the nature of which serve to blur the lines of 
what is and is not justifiable. The result being a perceived necessity of those who hold power 
around the world to act in desperate times, as is evidenced by the Bush administration. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
Torture, considered in a moral vacuum… is a palpable moral evil. Moral evils, 
however do not exist in a vacuum; they exist in collision with other evils, and 
sometimes we are forced to choose. Ask the average person if he opposes torture 
and the answer will surely be yes. But present him with a real-world scenario and 
the answer might well change.1 
Here, McCarthy inadvertently poses the question that repeatedly surfaces when considering 
torture; could there exist a situation whereby a positive outcome produced by means of 
torture can justify the moral evil of its employment? In essence, is torture ever justifiable?  
‘The word ‘torture’ has no precise universally agreed meaning. It can range from the most 
unmitigated cruelty as a prelude to death, to the most antiseptic, nonlethal, and even 
nonphysical mind games that police play with suspects.’2 Here-in lies the problem; torture 
means different things to different people.3 The lack of clear definition or distinct threshold of 
what constitutes torture has inevitably caused extensive discussion regarding its use. For 
example, the legal prohibitions put in place to prevent torture as a practice have been 
interpreted in disparate ways by documents such as the ‘Torture Memos’; a controversial 
and deeply scrutinised interpretation that ultimately contributed to its widespread use by the 
US post 9/11.4 Examining the word ‘torture’ from a solely moral perspective further 
complicates attempts to define it. If you view torture as being iniquitous due to its immorality, 
then perhaps actions that technically constitute torture, but fail to cross the moral-immoral 
threshold, may not be inherently wrong. This begs the question; is it immoral to subject an 
individual to coercive interrogation in a situation whereby lives may be saved by doing so? If 
not, then perhaps the interrogation, albeit unsavoury, should not be considered to be 
unacceptable. 
                                            
1Andrew C. McCarthy, 'Torture: Thinking about the Unthinkable' in Karen J. Greenberg (ed), The 
Torture Debate in America (Cambridge University Press 2006) 106. 
2Alan M Dershowitz, Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, Responding to the Challenge 
(Yale University Press 2002) 124. 
3
 This has caused concern internationally, see Chapter Five: Torture Across the World. 
4
 The memoranda 'were crucial in building a legal framework for United States officials to avoid 
complying with international laws and treaties on handling prisoners’. Neil A. Lewis, 'Justice Memos 
Explained How to Skip Prisoner Rights' New York Times (www.nytimes.com, 21st May 2004) 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/21/world/reach-war-geneva-conventions-justice-memos-explained-
skip-prisoner-rights.html> accessed 11 March 2016. 
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The question essentially being explored here, is whether morality is an absolute, or is 
dependent on the situation and the consequences?5 In the current context, is torture always 
immoral? Or could there exist a situation in which it is morally justifiable? A dynamic the 
ticking-bomb theory explores in detail. 
Though controversial, torture appears an inherent part of the modern world. The most recent 
examples being the widely reported atrocities carried out in the American run prisons of Abu 
Ghraib and Guantànamo Bay, displayed to the world through the haunting pictures 
publicised by the media.6 As such, it must be examined and debated. Torture is a critical 
issue;7 it not only affects politics, national security and human rights across the globe, but 
impacts on the public’s day-to-day lives due to the considerable amounts of attention 
devoted to it by news reports and visual media such as ‘24’8 and ‘Zero Dark Thirty’.9  
This thesis explores why torture, ‘deemed illegitimate by the modern world for more than a 
century’,10 has resurfaced as a topic of debate, and persists despite its formal legal 
prohibition.11 It also endeavours to shed light on the main issues involved in the modern 
‘torture debate’ by examining and presenting in a balanced manner the moral, legal and 
practical arguments for and against the use of torture. 
This thesis consists of a black letter, library based study using existing open source 
information drawn from an extensive range of sources. Books, journals, media sources, 
psychological research and studies, governmental information, speeches, NGO reports, 
                                            
5
 Kennedy Ahenkora Adarkwa, ‘Moral Absolutism Versus Moral Relativism’ 22 February 2013 
<http://www.liberty.edu/divinity/index.cfm?PID=26955&id=653923> accessed 28 November 2016. 
6
 See for example, The Guardian, ‘Torture scandal: The images that shamed America’ (The Guardian, 
date not provided) <http://www.theguardian.com/gall/0,8542,1211872,00.html> accessed 10 April 
2016. 
7
 Department of Justice, Peace and Human Development Office of International Justice and Peace, 
‘Background on Torture’ 2013 <http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/human-life-and-
dignity/torture/upload/2013-02-TortureBackgrounder-FINAL.pdf> accessed 10 April 2016. 
8
 The American television series 24 includes the use of beatings and injections by a medical 
professional. 
9
 Zero Dark Thirty, a 2012 film directed by Katherine Bigelow, depicts the use of waterboarding, sleep 
deprivation and forcing of detainees into coffin-like boxes by American forces and agencies during the 
Iraq and Afghan wars. 
10
 Alan Dershowitz, ‘The Case for Torturing the Ticking Bomb Terrorist’ in James E. White, 
Contemporary Moral Problems: War, Terrorism, Torture and Assassination (4th edn, Wadsworth 
Publishing Co Inc 2011) 65. 
11
 Christopher J. Einolf, ‘The Fall and Rise of Torture: A Comparative and Historical Analysis’ (2007) 
25(2) Sociological Theory 101, 101 and 109. 
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case law and legal instruments will all be drawn upon. Given the sensitive nature of the 
subject, certain closed sources, such as classified government reports, may not be 
accessible, this will somewhat limit access to verified information. Further, it should be  
noted that some of the sources referenced throughout this thesis will not be 'objective'. As is 
explained by Del Rosso, torture ‘evidence is neither neutral nor complete; it provides a 
vantage on particular representations of reality and not others. To access the… ‘experience’ 
of torture… we must pass, first, through a selective witnessing of those experiences’.12 For 
example, some documents are ‘bureaucratic, replacing the lived experience of those who 
practiced or suffered torture with a stiff and, typically, euphemistic official vocabulary’13 in 
order to justify or misrepresent governmental policies. Alternatively, NGOs and state 
opponents which scrutinise and criticise said policies, may skew statistics, overstate 
problems, or paint decisions badly whilst aiming to further their cause. 
Motives and agendas aside, an additional problem lies in the initial recounting of abuse, and 
the inaccuracies in reporting to which this inevitably leads. As victims present testimony, 
elements of the scene of torture dissipate as many are unable or unwilling to fully recount 
the horrors they suffered. Thus, ‘because our access to the reality of torture is always 
mediated by these sorts of partial accounts, our knowledge of it is always selective and 
incomplete.’14 This thesis aims to address this issue by providing a variety of evidence both 
for and against each argument. 
Chapter two explores the history of torture; its origins, uses, methods, justifications and 
eventual abolition. Chapter three aims to map the change in dynamics America underwent 
as a consequence of 9/11, and how this altered both public and institutional views towards 
torture. It provides a context for the modern torture debate and discusses some of the 
methods of torture used in the Iraq and Afghan wars. Chapter four sets out the international 
and domestic legal prohibitions on torture. Chapter five focuses on the efficacy of the legal 
                                            
12
 Jared Del Rosso, Talking About Torture: How Political Discourse Shapes The Debate (Columbia 
University Press 2015) 26. 
13
 ibid 25. 
14
 ibid 26. 
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prohibition of torture and offers explanations suggesting why certain states choose to break 
it. Allowing for a small amount of cross over, chapter six and seven respectfully examine the 
arguments for and against the use of torture. Finally, chapter eight consists of a review of the 
main discussion points, followed by my own conclusions on the justifiability of torture based 
on the arguments provided. The concept of a ‘torture cycle’ is explored here. 
Chapter Two: The Historical Dimension                              
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Chapter Two: The Historical Dimension 
Murphy alleges that ‘[t]he propensity for man to torture his fellow man is as old as civilisation 
itself’.15 This statement appears to be accurate; according to the museum of torture, ‘the 
systematic use of torture in criminal procedures dates back to the earliest civilisations with 
scenes depicting torture and corporal punishment being found on ancient Mesopotamian 
and Egyptian monuments.’16  
Scott suggests that ‘[a]s society developed out of savagery into civilization, and as codes of 
laws and regulations were enacted, the torture which was inflicted by primitive man to satisfy 
his vengeance… crystallised itself into a definitive method of torture justified as a system of 
punishment.’17 Under the newly established regulatory model, ‘torture – in some greater or 
lesser form, as befits the crime - was usually practiced as a means of punishing 
wrongdoers.’18 ‘When a criminal or transgressor against the prevailing moral code, was 
whipped, crucified or otherwise horribly killed or maimed, it provided a graphic example that 
the law was being upheld and society was being kept safe’.19 In this manner, torture existed 
as ‘part of a workable system that kept the established powers securely in their place’20 and 
sought to maintain order. 
For the Roman jurist Ulpian, torture was a customary activity judges used ‘to unearth 
crimes’21 in addition to punishing them. Ulpian asserts that ‘[b]y quaestio, [that is, torture], we 
are to understand the torment and suffering of the body in order to elicit the truth.’22 Yet the 
first evidence of the legally authorised application of torture to prove guilt or innocence 
                                            
15
 Michael Joseph Murphy, Fiendish Ingenuity (CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform 2010) 
8.  
16
 The Museum of Torture, ‘History of Torture’ (2015) <http://tortureum.com/history-of-torture/> 
accessed 26 August 2017. 
17
 George Riley Scott, A History of Torture (1995 edn, Senate 1940) 8. 
18
 Mark P Donnelly and Daniel Diehl, The Big Book of Pain (The History Press 2008) 4. 
19
 ibid. 
20
 ibid 6. 
21
 Darius Rejali, Torture and Democracy (4th edn, Princeton University Press 2009) 35; Ulpian, 
‘Duties of Proconsul’ in Edward Peters, Torture (2nd edn, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press 1996) 215.  
22
 Darius Rejali, Torture and Democracy (4th edn, Princeton University Press 2009) 1.  
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predates the Romans; such proof can be found in the Sumerian Code of Ur-Nammu23 and 
the Babylonian Code of Hammurabi.24 Donnelly and Diehl suggest that evidence of torture 
can be found in all cultures; they state that over the millennia, thousands of civilisations have 
risen and fallen, but the use of torture has remained pretty much constant.25 But the forms of 
torture used, and the motives driving them, have both evolved.  
Historically, the methods of torture practiced were certainly more extreme than those which 
are seen today. For example, two of the most brutal tortures, castration and burning at the 
stake, have both been frequently used throughout history. The Egyptian, Alexander, for 
example, commonly used the punishment of castration as a means of deterring rape.26 The 
use of burning at the stake as a form of torture, albeit torture as a means of execution, has 
also been evidenced in various cultures throughout history; ‘[It] was the favourite sentence 
for those found guilty of heresy by the Inquisition… It was also the preferred method 
throughout all the countries in Europe, regardless of their faith, for dealing with alleged 
sorcerers and witches.’27 The antiquity of burning alive as a form of torturous execution is 
even established in the Bible; John 15:6 states that ‘[i]f a man abide not in me, he is cast 
forth as a branch, and is withered; and men gather, and cast them into the fire, and they are 
burned.’28 Whereas the methods of torture most frequently practiced in the modern age, 
whilst horrific, lack the same degree of extremity. 
Donnelly and Diehl further suggest that over the years the motives behind torture have 
‘evolved from simple punishment to the need to extract information.’29 Classical tortures 
marked their victims’ ‘bodies as religion or custom required; they often branded or scarred in 
public, using bodies to advertise state power and deter others from similar behavior’.30 By 
                                            
23
 21st Century BC. 
24
 18th Century BC; The Museum of Torture, ‘History of Torture’ (2015) <http://tortureum.com/history-
of-torture/> accessed 26 August 2017. 
25
 Mark P Donnelly and Daniel Diehl, The Big Book of Pain (The History Press 2008) 5. 
26
 Michael Joseph Murphy, Fiendish Ingenuity (CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform 2010) 
27.  
27
 Michael Joseph Murphy, Fiendish Ingenuity (CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform 2010) 
38; Edward Ryan, ‘Spanish Inquisition’ (Encyclopaedia Britannica) 
<https://www.britannica.com/topic/Spanish-Inquisition> accessed 26 August 2017. 
28
 The Bible John 15:6. 
29
 Mark P Donnelly and Daniel Diehl, The Big Book of Pain (The History Press 2008) 5. 
30
 Darius Rejali, Torture and Democracy (4th edn, Princeton University Press 2009) 35. 
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contrast, ‘modern torturers favour pains that intimidate the prisoner… apply[ing] physical 
pain in order to touch the mind or warp a sense of self, and thereby shape the self-
understandings of prisoners and dispose them to willing, compliant action’31 in order to force 
the disclosure of information. Rejali summarises that ‘some modern tortures have classical 
roots, and some classical torturers sought to convert minds with fear and pain, [but] there is 
no mistaking… how the emphasis has changed over time.’32 
 As Lightcap and Pfiffner explain, ‘[t]he use of torture under the auspices of the state has a 
long history in the Western legal tradition. Torture was prescribed in accord with Roman 
canon law to obtain confessions for serious crimes.’33 Langbein suggests that states tortured 
in part because ‘[t]he prescribed standard of proof sufficiency was very demanding. 
Conviction of serious crime required either the testimony of two unimpeachable 
eyewitnesses or the defendant's confession before the judge.’34 As a result of a lack of 
witnesses, inter alia, ‘the Roman-canon system turned to the practice of coercing 
confessions.’35 For half a millennium, the law courts of continental Europe tortured suspects, 
acting openly and according to the law,36 perhaps most famous in this regard was the 
Spanish Inquisition. Between 1478 and 1808, the Spanish Inquisition, headed by Thomas de 
Torquemada, burned alive more than 33,000 Spanish men, women and children, and 
tortured or imprisoned a further 290,000.37  
However, over the centuries it became clear that torture produced unreliable evidence and 
inaccurate confessions. As early as 1764, jurists such as Beccaria denounced torture; 
declaring that it emanated from ‘the most barbarous [of] ages’ and describing its persistence 
as ‘an enduring monument to the ancient and savage legislation of an age when ordeals by 
                                            
31
 ibid. 
32
 ibid. 
33
 Tracy Lightcap and James P. Pfiffner, ‘Introduction’ in Tracy Lightcap and James P. Pfiffner (eds), 
Examining Torture: Empirical Studies of State Repression (Palgrave Macmillan 2014) 2-3. 
34
 Mirjan Damaska ‘The Death of legal Torture’ (1978-9) 87 The Yale Law Journal 859, 861. 
35
 ibid. 
36
 John H Langbein, ‘The Legal History of Torture’ In Sanford Levinson (ed), Torture: A Collection 
(Oxford University Press, 2004) 93. 
37
 Mark P Donnelly and Daniel Diehl, The Big Book of Pain (The History Press 2008) 83, 93. 
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fires and boiling water… were called ‘judgement’ of gods’.’38 ’In the end, the European states 
conceded that the long experiment with torture was a failure’39 and they consequently 
‘abolished the system of judicial torture within about two generations.’40 Between the years 
of 1740 and 1787, Prussia, Saxony, Denmark, Poland, Austria-Bohemia, France, Tuscany, 
Belgium and Sicily all disestablished the practice, and by the early nineteenth century, 
abolition had reached the last corners of the Continent.41 Torture, as a practice, had gone 
‘from being an official part of the penal system to being considered beyond the pale of an 
enlightened nation’.42  
Now, ‘torture is generally… condemned in philosophy, scholarship and the law.’43 However, 
‘[t]he abolition of judicial torture… did not vanquish the practice.’44 Over 100 years after its 
Europe-wide abolition, and 250 years after Beccaria’s teachings, torture is still used across 
the globe. Yet, instead of the formally recognised judicial process torture previously 
represented, in its place an illegal and covert practice exists. Dershowitz makes the 
argument that it is the existence of an unrealistic absolute ban on torture that has driven 
torture ‘beneath the radar screen of accountability’45  He suggests that enforcing a quixotic 
absolute prohibition has only ensured that torture is outwardly condemned, whilst it 
continues to be practised, often covertly, because states will always employ torture where 
they deem it to be necessary, as most recently evidenced during the Iraq and Afghan wars; 
the examination of which is the focus of the following chapter. 
 
 
                                            
38
 Cesare Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishment 1764, trans David Young (Hackett Publishing Co 
1986) 30. 
39
 John H Langbein, ‘The Legal History of Torture’ In Sanford Levinson (ed), Torture: A Collection 
(Oxford University Press, 2004) 93. 
40
 ibid 61-64 and 177-179. 
41
 Ibid. 
42
 Jared Del Rosso, Talking About Torture: How Political Discourse Shapes The Debate (Columbia 
University Press 2015) 6. 
43
 Tracy Lightcap and James P. Pfiffner, ‘Introduction’ in Tracy Lightcap and James P. Pfiffner (eds), 
Examining Torture: Empirical Studies of State Repression (Palgrave Macmillan 2014) 2-3. 
44
 Jared Del Rosso, Talking About Torture: How Political Discourse Shapes The Debate (Columbia 
University Press 2015) 21. 
45
 Alan M. Dershowitz, ‘The Torture Warrant: A Response to Professor Strauss’ (2004) 48 New York 
Law School Law Review 275, 278. 
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Chapter Three:  9/11 and The Iraq War 
Prior to 9/11, a terrorist attack in which Al-Qaeda, a group based in Afghanistan,46 destroyed 
the Twin Towers, America publicly condemned states that tortured. The US Senate ratified 
the Convention Against Torture, Congress enacted anti-torture legislation, and judicial 
opinions spoke of ‘the dastardly and totally inhuman act of torture’.47 After 9/11, this rapidly 
changed; Al-Qaeda had demonstrated they that were capable of carrying out extreme 
violence in the heart of America whilst only using a group of minimally trained fanatics. This 
revelation forced those in positions of responsibility to rethink their notions of risk, and 
therefore rethink what needed to be done to combat that risk.48 In response, ‘[t]he Bush 
administration seemingly determined that winning the war on terror required that the United 
States circumvent international law’49 by justifying and practicing coercive interrogation. As 
Cofer Black, former director of the CIA’s counterterrorist unit, summarised in testimony to 
Congress, ‘There was a before-9/11 and an after-9/11… After 9/11 the gloves came off.’50  
The events of September 11th had a profound effect on America; Al-Qaeda had struck at the 
heart of Western civilisation with devastating consequences, making it clear that the threat 
posed by terrorism was much greater than previously imagined.51 As a result, there was an 
overwhelming sense of a need for retaliation; speaking in response to 9/11, George Bush 
stated: ‘I want justice. There’s an old poster out west, as I recall, that said, “Wanted: Dead or 
Alive.”… All I want and America wants [Osama bin Laden] brought to justice.’52 This 
                                            
46
 BBC News, ‘Al-Qaeda’s Origins and Links’ 20 July 2004 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/1670089.stm> accessed 1 April 2016. 
47
 Filartiga v Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 883 (2nd Cir 1980) and David Luban, ‘Liberalism, Torture, and 
the Ticking Bomb’ in Karen J. Greenberg (ed), The Torture Debate in America (Cambridge University 
Press 2006) 35. 
48
 Philip Zelikow, ‘Codes of Conduct For A Twilight War’ 2012 49(1) Houston Law Review 1, 6. 
49
 Human Rights Watch, 'The Road to Abu Ghraib' June 2004. 
50
 John Barry, Michael Hirsh and Michael Isikoff, ‘The roots of terror’ (Newsweek, 24 May 2004). 
51
 The severity of 9/11 undoubtedly raised the stakes, ultimately posing the question; could the 
increased threat from terrorism justify torture? 
52
 George W Bush, 17 September 2001; Toby Harden, ‘Bin Laden is Wanted: Dead or Alive, says 
Bush’ (The Telegraph, 18 September 2001).  
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sentiment was met with the resounding approval of US voters, with 72% of American’s 
supporting the Iraq invasion.53 The ‘war on terror’ had begun. 
In 2001, Vice-President Dick Cheney stated in an interview on Meet the Press, that the 
government might have to go to ‘the dark side’;54 by this, he meant employing coercive 
interrogation. This attitude was mirrored by the American public. Less than a week after 
9/11, in a quiz given in a university ethics class on responses to a terrorist attack, when 
given the options to (A) execute the perpetrators on sight, (B) bring them back to the US for 
trial, (C) subject them to international tribunal, or (D) torture and interrogate them; most 
students chose (A) and (D).55 A national poll held by CNN and USA Today provides a 
broader picture of American public opinion towards torture in the wake of 9/11. It revealed 
that forty-five percent of those surveyed supported the use of torture when interrogating 
suspected terrorists.56 Whilst the poll failed to show a majority favouring the use of torture, it 
must be remembered that torture is a supposedly barbaric, immoral, and legally prohibited 
practice. With this in mind, the fact that nearly half of the participants supported its use 
becomes significant and demonstrates an echoing of Cheney’s comments. 
Just three days after 9/11, Congress passed, by overwhelming margins (ninety-eight votes 
to zero), S.J.Res.23: Authorization for Use of Military Force 2001 s.2(a). This extraordinary 
measure authorised the use of ‘all necessary and appropriate force’57 against its 
perpetrators,58 thus emphatically affirming and giving formal legal backing to Bush and 
                                            
53
 Frank Newport, ‘Seventy-Two Percent of Americans Support War Against Iraq’ 24 March 2003 
<http://www.gallup.com/poll/8038/seventytwo-percent-americans-support-war-against-iraq.aspx> 
accessed 10 April 2016. 
54
 Meet the Press, ‘Interview with Dick Cheney’ 16 September 2001 at 5 minutes 25 seconds. 
55
 Amy Argetsinger, ‘At Colleges, Students are Facing a Big Test’ (Washington Post, 17 September 
2001) <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/2001/09/17/at-colleges-students-are-facing-a-
big-test/b2195efd-8022-4b26-95bb-ce2b8404ee3f/> accessed 21 March 2016. 
56
 Paul Gronke and others, ‘U.S. Public Opinion On Torture, 2001-2009’ (Reed College, July 2010) 
<http://www.reed.edu/poli_sci/faculty/rejali/articles/US_Public_Opinion_Torture_Gronke_Rejali.pdf.> 
accessed 13 December 2016. 
57
 S.J.Res.23: Authorization for Use of Military Force 2001 s.2(a). 
58
 Passing by 98-0 in the senate and 420-1 in the House of Representatives 
<http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?&congress=107&session
=1&vote=00281> accessed 11 April 2016. 
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Cheney’s bellicose statements. 9/11, and America’s reaction to it, catalysed the re-ignition of 
the torture debate; in the words of Alter, it was ‘Time to Think About Torture’.59  
During the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the use of torture by US forces and agencies 
became systematic, to a point, accepted as normative, and in some cases even encouraged, 
despite the fact it is clearly prohibited by various laws, both domestic and international.60 An 
American official described as having supervisory control over suspected terrorists in 
Afghanistan stated in interview that, ‘[i]f you don’t violate someone’s human rights some of 
the time, you probably aren’t doing your job.’61 Such implicit recognition of the use of abuse 
speaks to its level of acceptance as a method of interrogation. 
The list of abuses, as recorded by the ‘Red Cross Torture Report’,62 range from the now 
infamous water-boarding,63 beatings,64 and sleep deprivation,65 to more obscure forms of 
coercive interrogation, such as exposures to cold temperatures or water,66 and confinement 
in boxes.67 These techniques were not used in isolation; ‘each specific method was in fact 
applied in combination with other methods, either simultaneously or in succession’68 in order 
to break the detainee. 
Waterboarding, formerly known as ‘A-Selli’, is thought to have originated during the times of 
the Spanish Inquisition.69 It ‘involves strapping down a detainee, covering their face with a 
cloth and then pouring water over the nose and mouth to create [the] terrifying sensation of 
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drowning.’70 This description, however, fails to capture the truly hazardous nature of 
waterboarding. Malcolm Nance, national security expert, former member of US military and 
former SERE71 Navy instructor, described his experience of waterboarding in front of the 
House Subcommittee on the Constitution.72 Nance recounted: 
Contrary to popular opinion, it is not a simulation of drowning. It is drowning. In my 
case, the technique was so fast and professional that I didn’t know what was 
happening until the water entered my nose and throat. It then pushes down into the 
trachea and starts to process a respiratory degradation.  It is an overwhelming 
experience that induces horror, triggers a frantic survival instinct. As the event 
unfolded, I was fully conscious of what was happening: I was being tortured.73 
During the hearing, Arthur Davis asked Nance a series of questions regarding the possible 
outcomes of waterboarding. Davis queried whether if ‘done in the wrong way’ could 
waterboarding ‘kill somebody,’ ‘cause someone to have a seizure,’ and ‘cause brain 
damage’? Nance answered in the affirmative to each question, adding that waterboarding 
could ‘easily’ kill someone.74 Therefore, using Nance’s experience for reference, 
waterboarding is much more than ‘the sensation of drowning’, which, whilst horrific, appears 
to be a physically ‘safe’ form of interrogation. Instead, the waterboard has the potential to not 
only cause brain damage, but also to kill someone.  
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the self-professed planner of 9/11, was a victim of the 
waterboard 183 times during interrogations carried out by the CIA,75 a shockingly high 
number given the very real threat waterboarding poses to its victims. The Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence’s study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program revealed 
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that Abu Zubaydah, a purportedly high ranking Al-Qaeda official, was also subjected to 
waterboarding. Zubaydah was reported as having ‘coughed, vomited and [suffered] 
‘involuntary spasms of the torso and extremities’’76 before becoming ‘completely 
unresponsive, with bubbles rising through his open, full mouth…. [He] remained 
unresponsive until medical intervention, when he regained consciousness and expelled 
‘copious amounts of liquid’.77 
Not only was Zubayday the subject of waterboading, he was also forced to suffer ‘sleep 
deprivation’. This process ‘involve[s] keeping detainees awake for up to 180 hours, usually 
standing or in stress positions, at times with their hands shackled above their heads.’78 
Zubaydah alleged that ‘very loud ‘shouting music’ was constantly played on an 
approximately fifteen minute repeat loop twenty-four hours a day’; ‘if [he] started to fall 
asleep a guard would come and spray water in [his] face’.79 Begin, a young man tortured in 
the Soviet Union, describes the hellish nature of sleep deprivation. The spirit of a sleep-
deprived prisoner is ‘wearied to death, his legs are unsteady, and he has one sole desire to 
sleep, to sleep just a little, not to get up, to lie, to rest, to forget… Anyone who has 
experienced this desire knows that not even hunger or thirst are comparable with it.’80  
The Senate report also provides evidence of the use of ‘rectal rehydration and feeding’ on 
five detainees.81  The CIA subjected Khalid Shaikh Mohammed to rectal rehydration ‘without 
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a determination of medical need’82 and administered ‘rectal fluid resuscitation’83 to Abu 
Zubaydah because he ‘partially refus[ed] liquids’84 despite its proven ineffectiveness as a 
medical procedure. The idea that the CIA would seek to justify the practice by claiming it was 
medically necessary is absurd given that the Journal of the American Medical Association 
states that the ‘vogue of using nutritional enemas… has disappeared almost completely, 
largely because the human body does not effectively absorb nutrients through the colon’,85 
making it useless from a nutritional standpoint. Vincent Iacopino, senior medical advisor for 
Physicians for Human Rights, described the practice as ‘a form of sexual assault 
masquerading as a medical treatment’.86  
As horrific as these examples may appear, for those who are religious, there perhaps exists 
a more terrifying prospect: 
Notable in Abu Ghraib, was the despicable use of religion to humiliate. One Muslim 
was allegedly forced to eat pork [and] had liquor forced down his throat… He 
recounted in broken English: “They stripped me naked; they asked me ‘Do you pray 
to Allah?’ I said, ‘Yes’. They said ‘Fuck you’ and ‘Fuck him’.87  
Dubensky opines that ‘[t]he straightforward pain of physical torture is impossible to fathom… 
torture that is designed to strip a man or woman of his or her identity, religion, and core 
beliefs seems somehow even more insidious.’88 Exploration beyond the now renowned 
methods of torture reveals the extent to which all areas of the victim’s life are accessible for 
abuse. Lazreg explains that ‘[b]ecause torture as a practice, attacks, in addition to its victims 
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bodies, their social worlds, ethnocentric, sexist, racist and religious beliefs and the sexuality 
of the victims frequently shape the practise of torture.’89   
One process, referenced in the US Senate Intelligence Committee’s report into CIA torture,90 
has been referred to by psychologists Jessen and Mitchell, as ‘learned helplessness’. In the 
context of torture, it can be best explained as the process of breaking down an individual’s 
self-control until they are emotionally and psychologically unequipped to disobey,91 and thus 
willing to cooperate. 
The torture employed by the US during  the ‘war on terror’ not only inflicted copious amounts 
of physical and mental pain on a large scale, but also sought to deprive victims of their 
beliefs, core personalities, and willpower. Its justification was twofold; first, empirical 
evidence suggested that jihadist motivated terrorism associated with the like of Al-Qaeda 
and its allies such as 9/11 and the 7/7 London bombings, appeared to be significantly more 
deadly than terrorism carried out by other groups.92 Secondly, it was widely believed that Al-
Qaeda were spreading ‘[t]housands of dangerous killers… throughout the world like ticking 
bombs, set to go off without warning’.93 As a result of a combination of these factors, it was 
claimed that extraordinary measures, such as coercive interrogation, were necessary in 
order to find these individuals and prevent further terrorist attacks from happening. The initial 
‘appeal was that rare use of torture interrogation of key terrorists could thwart terrorist plans 
of mass destruction at minimal cost to civil liberties and democratic process.’94 
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Chapter Four: The Legal Prohibitions on Torture 
Torture is expressly prohibited by a range of international conventions and is widely 
considered to be a ‘crime against humanity’.95  
Both torture and cruel and inhuman treatment are expressly forbidden by the United Nations 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CAT).96 The US has been party to CAT since it became signatory to the UN as 
one of the original fifty-one countries in 1945, making all UN Conventions binding on it. 
Article 1 of the Convention defines torture as:  
Any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is 
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him… 
information… when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or 
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an 
official capacity.97 
Article 2 states that ‘Each State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial 
or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction.’98 America 
fulfilled these obligations by codifying the Convention into US law via sections 2340-2340A 
of Chapter 113C, Title 18 of the US Code. 
Section 2340(1) of the US Code defines torture as ‘an act committed by a person acting 
under the color of law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or 
suffering… upon another person within his custody or physical control’.99 Section 2340A 
contains the punishment for committing torture, stating: ‘Whoever outside the United States 
commits or attempts to commit torture shall be fined… or imprisoned… or both, and if death 
                                            
95
 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 7(f); Statute of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Article 5(f) and Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, Article 3(f). 
96
 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
1984.  
97
 ibid Part 1, Article 1. 
98
 ibid Part 1, Article 2(1). 
9918 U.S. Code § 2340(1). 
Chapter Four: The Legal Prohibitions on Torture 
17 
 
results to any person from [torture]… shall be punished by death or imprisoned for any term 
of years or for life.’100 
There is a further domestic prohibition contained in the US Bill of Rights, Amendment 8, 
which provides that ‘cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted’.101 Although the 
focus of this thesis is placed on the abuses practiced outside America, meaning the 8th 
Amendment is not the key legal provision in the context of this analysis, it does clearly 
demonstrate that torture is prohibited both internationally and nationally under US law. 
The Geneva Conventions, a set of ‘international treaties that form the basis of modern 
humanitarian law governing the treatment of soldiers and civilians during conflict’,102 similarly 
prohibit torture.103 The Third Geneva Convention, relevant to the Treatment of Prisoners in 
War, defines humanitarian protections for prisoners of war. Article 17 of the Convention 
states that ‘No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on 
prisoners of war… Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be… exposed to any 
unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind.’104 
Article 31 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, that relevant to the protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War, provides ‘No physical or moral coercion shall be exercised against 
protected persons, in particular to obtain information from them or from third parties.’105  
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The US became a signatory to the Geneva Conventions in 1949,106 meaning it is bound 
under part 1, Article 1 of both Conventions to ‘respect and to ensure respect for the present 
Convention in all circumstances.’107 
‘The legal prohibition of torture is widely understood as a peremptory rule, as derogation is 
considered impermissible.’108 Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights 1966,109 a treaty that America is party to, and Article 2(2) CAT stipulate that 
derogation from the prohibition on torture is not possible, even in times of ‘public emergency 
which threatens the life of the nation’,110 or a ‘state of war’.111  
The past decade has seen further anti-torture legislation put in place within the US. First, 
President Obama’s 2009 Executive Order 13491: Ensuring Lawful Interrogations112 was 
enacted in order to ‘improve the efficacy of interrogations, and to ensure that the U.S. 
respects domestic and international laws that prohibit torture and cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment’.113 This was later followed by the 2015 McCain-Feinstein Amendment 
to the National Defense Authorisation Act for Fiscal Year 2016;114 a measure ‘designed to 
strengthen the prohibition on torture and ensure that the United States never engages in 
torture again.’115 
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This jus cogens prohibition on torture reflects the longstanding opposition to its practice 
founded substantially on the arguments against torture presented in chapter seven. 
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Chapter Five: Torture Across the World 
The 1984 UN Convention Against Torture,116 arguably the most influential modern anti-
torture prohibition: 
offered a set of concrete steps to make the global ban on torture a reality; by 
establishing a set of measures, [protected by] law and specifically designed to 
prevent torture, punish perpetrators and ensure justice and redress to victims, these 
measures intended… to end torture and other ill-treatment.117 
Amnesty International’s first international study of torture found that the practice had 
‘developed a life of its own and become a social cancer’; torture was ‘a practise encouraged 
by some governments and tolerated by others in an increasingly large number of 
countries’.118 Today, 155 countries are state parties to the UN Convention, suggesting 
comprehensive support for the prohibition of torture. However, ‘many governments are 
betraying their responsibility. Three decades on from the Convention – and more than 65 
years after the Universal Declaration – torture is not just alive and well. It is flourishing.’119 
Between January 2009 and May 2013, ‘Amnesty International received reports of torture and 
other ill-treatment committed by state officials in 141 countries, and from every world 
region.’120 According to a 2014 Amnesty International report, ‘individuals are tortured 
because of their political views or because they use their freedom of expression. People 
belonging to a particular religious or other minority group, or targeted because of their 
identity, also face increased risk.’121 
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In Saudi Arabia, for example, public whippings, clearly a form of torture to many, are still 
used as a form on punishment. In 2014, Saudi blogger Raif Badawi was imprisoned and 
sentenced to 1,000 lashes to be performed over 20 weeks for ‘insulting Islam through 
electronic channels’.122 Further, in July 2014, a 24-year-old man was jailed for 3 years and 
sentenced to 450 lashes by a court in Saudi Arabia for arranging a date with a man on 
Twitter.123 
Further, in Mexico: 
reports of torture have increased since 2006 as violence has spiralled in the context 
of the government’s fight against organized crime. Many detentions are made 
without a warrant, with suspects allegedly caught “red handed”, even if they did not 
have any direct connection to a crime or crime scene. All too often, people arrested 
without evidence are from poor and marginalized communities.124 
In America, Amnesty International reports that the US government has failed to ‘ensure 
accountability for torture and enforced disappearances committed in the context of counter-
terrorism operations.’125 There exists plenty of evidence that these abuses took place. 
Human Rights Watch provides an account of Ridha al-Najjar and Lofti El Gherissi’s 
experience. The two Tunisian nationals were sent to the notorious CIA black site, Cobalt, in 
Afghanistan after being arrested in Pakistan.126 Once there, ‘they usually went without food 
for days [or weeks] at a time… Al-Najjar said he lost 50 kilograms (110 pounds) during his 
detention at the CIA site.’127 A secret report carried out by Major General Antonio Taguba in 
2004 found that: 
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Other abuses… included pouring cold water on naked prisoners, beating inmates 
with a broom handle and chair, threats of rape, sodomy with a chemical light, using 
dogs to frighten and intimidate detainees, and forcing detainees to engage in 
sexually humiliating conduct, such as being arranged in "sexually explicit positions 
for photographing."128 
Despite the emerging evidence, ‘no one responsible for the use of interrogation techniques 
such as “water-boarding”, prolonged sleep deprivation, and stress positions in Central 
Intelligence Agency run secret detention centres around the world has been brought to 
justice’,129 suggesting that the US does not take the prohibition of torture seriously. Even 
domestically, and prior to the ‘war on terror’, thus dispelling any terrorism-related 
justifications, ‘the UN Committee on Torture claimed that American police officers and prison 
guards had engaged in various forms of torture and ill treatment on numerous occasions. Of 
particular concern being the use of electro-shock stun belts to restrain prisoners.’130  
Evidence such as this demonstrates the scale of the problem, both domestically and 
internationally, in terms of the US, and on a wider scale, across the globe. Perhaps more 
importantly, it also begs the question; why have the Convention Against Torture, and other 
similar prohibitions, proven to be ineffective in signatory countries such as Pakistan, Mexico 
and America? One answer lies in the definitional problems surrounding torture. 
Torture, as a concept, is hard to precisely define because it means different things to 
different people. For example, Human Rights Watch states that ‘[t]orture continues to be 
used routinely in Turkey’ and reports a long list of tortures including ‘dragging prisoners 
along the floor’.131 In comparison, a report on abuse allegations at Abu Ghraib between 
2001-2005 by the Mail Online includes a photograph of Lynndie England, one of the 
accused, dragging a prisoner along the ground attached to a dog lead. England was later 
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convicted by a Court Martial of abusing inmates.132 When discussing the matter, former army 
instructor, Tony Robinson, went as far as to say the prison photos did not even show torture; 
stating that ‘[f]rat hazing is worse than this’.133 
The point being made is that in the first example ‘dragging along the floor’ was defined as 
‘torture’, yet in the second example, the same offence is considered to be ‘abuse’, and even 
dismissed as ‘hazing’. The question that must be answered here is ‘[a]t what point does 
physical abuse become torture?’ If a prisoner were to be lightly pushed into a wall, few would 
define this as torture, although some would; but the fact is, they are being physically abused. 
With how much force does the victim need to be pushed for it to qualify as torture? The 
answer varies from person to person, making it almost impossible to clearly define. 
Murphy states that, ‘[t]here is no rigid line between torture and the concept of punishment; it 
is largely dependent on the perception of the individual victim concerned and their physical 
and mental reaction to the suffering experienced, as to whether something can be described 
as torture or not.’134 This is because pain thresholds vary from person to person; one 
individual may describe pain, another irritation, meaning torture is, in some sense, a 
subjective practice. 
The discrepancy as to what constitutes torture extends beyond individual cases to the 
differences that exist between cultures. For example, public flogging in Saudi Arabia is 
viewed and widely accepted as a humiliating punishment for wrongdoing, no different to 
imprisonment or a fine, not as torture.135 Whereas in the Western world, flogging is widely 
condemned136 and classified as a form of torture. Disparities such as these have caused 
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concern internationally, as the more stringent definition followed by the majority of the 
Western world has often been perceived as westerners imposing their views in terms of what 
constitutes ‘torture’ on the rest of the world.137 
‘In the case of psychological torture, a form of punishment considered relatively mild by one 
individual, might constitute a most horrible form of torture to another’.138 Therefore, it may be 
argued that what constitutes torture cannot be objectively decided, but rather must be 
examined on a subjective basis, according to the effect on the individual. As such, 
establishing a comprehensive definition of torture is all but impossible. 
Amnesty International suggests that governments often engage in torture because they 
‘believe that they benefit from [it], and [due to] the persistence of a culture of impunity, that 
is, the failure to bring to justice those responsible for serious violations of human rights and 
international humanitarian law’.139 Impunity often results from a ‘lack of political will, since the 
state itself – or a state arm such as the police or military – is frequently directly responsible 
or complicit in torture.’140 Such immunity of action allows states to control and even oppress 
their citizens. For example, Chinese authorities have punished human rights activists by 
denying them life saving medical treatments. In 2014, Cao Shunli died from organ failure in a 
Beijing hospital after officials at the prison she was held in for five months repeatedly 
prevented her from receiving vital medical treatment.141  
According to Amnesty International, ‘it continues to receive regular reports of torture and 
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment taking place in China’s “re-education through 
labor” camp facilities’,142 which are used in part to oppress Falun Gong practitioners.143 
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Former prisoner of the regime, Zhao Ming, was held at in one such camp from July 2000 to 
March 2002. He recounts that ‘[t]en inmates, under orders by the police guards in the camp, 
once beat me together, which made… me unable to walk for two weeks after that. Two 
weeks before I was released, I was shocked with 6 electric batons by 5 policemen while tied 
up on a bed board.’144 Falun Gong practitioner Wang Bingwen’s story serves as further 
evidence; he ‘was illegally detained at the Qingdao Forced Labor Camp over last two years.’ 
Whilst detained, the police deprived Bingwen ‘of sleep for 14 consecutive days, suffocated 
him with smoke, burned him, stabbed him with needles, and beat him.145  
States are able to employ such policies because, whilst ‘the Convention Against Torture is… 
quite strong in substance, it is remarkably weak in enforcement.’146 The central enforcement 
procedure for the Convention is a requirement that, under Article 19 of CAT, ‘[t]he States 
Parties shall submit to the Committee… [against torture] reports on the measures they have 
taken to give effect to their undertakings under this Convention.’147 However, failure to abide 
by this commitment is frequently ignored; as of 2000, an average of 71 percent of all State 
parties to each treaty have overdue reports, whilst 110 states have five or more overdue 
reports.148 Without an effective enforcement procedure, there is a limit to the usefulness of 
any convention; once states recognise that there are few negative consequences for failing 
to adhere to a prohibition, there is little incentive, beyond pacta sunt servanda,149 to act in 
accordance with it. 
Hathaway suggests that states ‘join treaties like the Convention against Torture in no small 
part to make themselves look good. In doing so they may hope to attract more foreign 
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investment, aid donations, international trade, and other tangible benefits.’150 States are 
aware that they can reap the benefits signing such conventions provide, without actually 
having to adhere to their provisions because there is little to no risk of facing sanctions due 
to a breach.  
When the evidence discussed above is considered, it becomes apparent that the use of 
torture is not limited to the intelligence gathering justifications provided during the Iraq and 
Afghan wars. Instead, some states employ torture as a means of oppressing certain sections 
of society, or in order to quell those who oppose or protest against their regime or practices. 
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Chapter Six: The Torture Debate – The Case For 
The Torture Memos 
The so called ‘Torture Memos’, originally drafted by Deputy Assistant Attorney General, John 
Yoo, and signed by Assistant Attorney General, Jay S. Bybee, in 2002, advised the CIA, the 
President and USDOD on the legality of the use of enhanced interrogation techniques and 
counselled that the 'humanitarian Geneva Conventions were inapplicable to Taliban 
detainees or persons suspected of links with Al-Qaeda.'151 
Yoo and Bybee redefined torture as the infliction of physical pain ‘equivalent in intensity to 
the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily 
function or even death’,152 or the infliction of mental pain which ‘results in significant 
psychological harm of significant duration e.g. lasting for months or even years.’153 By raising 
the threshold regarding what constituted and could therefore be punished as torture,154 the 
memos sought to limit the application of the Convention’s scope so as to enable US forces 
to carry out coercive interrogation 'lawfully' without fear of reprisal. 
Yoo and Bybee came to the conclusion that the ‘Treaty's text prohibits only the most 
extreme acts by reserving criminal penalties solely for torture and declining to require such 
penalties for "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment"'.155 This allowed them to 
justify the use of coercive interrogation by suggesting that it did not surpass the requisite 
altered threshold for torture, and as such, amounted to only 'cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment'.  This meant that any sanctioned coercive interrogation carried out 
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by US forces would not be severe or extreme enough to constitute torture, thus making it 
legal. 
The ability to construct a somewhat tortuous legal case, permitting the use of coercive 
interrogation within the confinements of the aforementioned legislation,156 suggests that 
coercive interrogation, from a legal standpoint, may technically be acceptable provided it 
does not exceed a certain degree of severity.  
These memos, however, have perhaps unsurprisingly come under severe criticism and 
intense scrutiny, with some critics charging ‘that the memoranda focused less on a 
responsible analysis of the legal and policy issues involved than on proposing arguments to 
protect those involved in coercive interrogation techniques from potential prosecution under 
US law.'157 Prima facie, this criticism detracts from the value of Yoo and Bybee’s arguments; 
if the memoranda were fixated on protecting US forces from prosecution, perhaps they had 
neglected to consider the bigger legal and political issues involved?158 
It is however arguable that, in examining the potential prosecution of US forces, the 
memoranda were actually exploring the most important legal issue; law only operates where 
crimes have actually been committed. By definition, crime is ‘an action 
or omission which constitutes an offence and is punishable by law’.159 In order to be 
punishable, the act, in this case coercive interrogation, must ‘constitute an offence’ under 
law; if it does not, then it is clearly not illegal. So, in demonstrating that the use of coercive 
interrogation did not constitute an offence under US and international law, Yoo and Bybee 
were actually tackling the key legal issue; is ‘torture’ legal? If a viable legal framework is 
enacted, this would provide legal justification for its use. Therefore, as coercive interrogation 
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fails to constitute a crime, it could be suggested that it is not in all instances the abhorrent 
practice depicted in chapter seven. 
Yoo and Bybee also attempted to nullify the concept of 'specific intent' through the use of 
case law. This was based on the idea that in order to breach section 2340A, the ‘severe pain 
or suffering’ must have been inflicted with specific intent; that is to say, the accused must 
have expressly intended to achieve the forbidden act.160 If the defendant acted knowing 
severe pain was reasonably likely to result from his actions, but no more, he only had 
general intention, not specific intent. As a theoretical matter, knowledge alone that a 
particular result is certain to occur does not constitute specific intent. As stated in Vacco v 
Quill,161 the law distinguishes between ‘actions taken 'because of' a given end, from actions 
taken 'in spite of their unintended but foreseen' consequences.’162 Thus, even if the 
defendant knows severe pain will result from his actions, if causing such harm is not his 
objective, he lacks the requisite specific intent. Instead, a defendant is guilty of torture only if 
he acts with the express purpose of inflicting severe pain or suffering.163 Therefore, if an 
interrogator inflicts severe pain on a detainee, but it was not his objective, that instead being 
the obtaining of information, they lack the specific intent required to commit a crime. As 
such, any ‘torture’ committed under such circumstances fails to constitute an offence, 
bringing the discussion back to the previously drawn conclusion; torture is not legally 
prohibited. 
In seeking to justify a potential breach of section 2340A, Yoo and Bybee discuss a 'choice of 
evils'164 as a defence for troops acting in 'good faith'.165 The defence, commonly known as 
the ‘necessity defence’, permitted conduct that the actor believed to be necessary to avoid a 
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harm or evil, provided that the harm sought to be avoided was greater than that sought to be 
prevented by the law defining the offense charged.166   
 
The Necessity Defence 
The purpose underlying this argument is one of public policy. LaFave argues that 'the law 
ought to promote the achievement of higher values at the expense of lesser values, and 
sometimes the greater good for society will be accomplished by violating the literal language 
of the criminal law.'167 This line of thinking is reflected in the torture memos, where Yoo and 
Bybee suggest that 'any harm that might occur during an interrogation would pale to 
insignificance compared to the harm avoided by preventing [an attack].'168  
Essentially, in such a situation, 'the evil involved in violating the terms of the criminal law 
may be less than that which would result from literal compliance with the law.'169 The Landau 
Commission found that the decisive factor in determining whether the necessity defence can 
be raised is ‘the comparison between… the evil of contravening the law as opposed to the 
evil which will occur sooner or later’,170 from an attack. Therefore, as a matter of public 
policy, in circumstances where the lives saved hold greater importance than adhering to the 
law, it is argued that torture should be acceptable, and in some instances even promoted.  
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The Torture Memos (Revisited) 
The Levin memo, the replacement for the retracted Bybee memo, opens with the statement: 
‘Torture is abhorrent both to American law and values and to international norms.’171 This 
suggests a ringing affirmation of US opposition to torture, however, the Levin memo does 
not substantially broaden its scope. All of the examples of ‘the nature of the extreme conduct 
that falls within the statutory definition’172 of torture fall on the upper end of the spectrum of 
barbarism,173 for example, severe beatings with metal pipes or the pulling out of 
fingernails.174 Levin includes no indication that any form of torture ‘lighter’ than these are 
prohibited by Law. 
Luban describes it as ‘the minimum possible retraction..: it retracts only the portions that 
journalists had criticised harshly… and retains a conception of torture as atrocity fully in line 
with the liberal ideology of torture.’175 Although taken at face value the memo appears to 
condemn torture, in actual fact it does little to retract from the controversial Bybee memo, 
demonstrating a behind-the-scenes acceptance of torture at the highest levels of US 
government and a reluctance to take torture off the board completely. This therefore clearly 
represents a maintaining of the stance that torture can still be deemed legal if it fails to reach 
the requisite ‘extreme conduct’ threshold necessary for committing an offence. 
 
Other Types of Intelligence 
As will be discussed in ‘The Questionable Efficacy of Torture’ section below,176 there are few 
cases in which ‘ticking bomb’ intelligence, that is to say information relating to immediate 
threats, has been disclosed as a result of torture. However, there is evidence to suggest that 
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coercive interrogation has helped to build a picture of the inner workings and operational 
habits of terrorist organisations; this information is known as ‘infrastructure intelligence’. 
Sritzke states that ‘[i]nfrastructure intelligence is the picture of the human and physical 
resources of terrorist groups’;177 it ‘concerns such things as information relating to group 
organisation, cell membership, expertise, finances, and recruiters, arms dumps, trainers, 
safe houses, ideology, as well as plans for future terrorist attacks.’178  
Both ticking-bomb intelligence and infrastructure intelligence can prevent attacks and 
undermine the ability of terrorist groups to function effectively, meaning that both can save 
lives. Rumney explains that the main difference exists in the way they are able to do so; 
‘ticking bomb intelligence may frustrate an imminent attack’,179 whereas ‘infrastructure 
intelligence will assist authorities in undermining the ability of terrorist groups to recruit, 
finance their activities and generally operate in the longer term.’180 Thus infrastructure 
intelligence may save lives in the longer term, but ‘is very unlikely to prevent an imminent 
attack because it is more concerned with the organisational structure and the inner workings 
of terrorist groups’. 181  
But is a life saved in the ‘longer term’, still not a life saved? What does it matter whether the 
threat posed is immediate or delayed; a threat is still a threat, both can cause the loss of life. 
‘Evidence from the CIA’s evaluation suggests that it uncovered from senior Al-Qaeda 
operatives, as well as lower functionaries, considerable infrastructure intelligence’,182 
allowing them to disrupt terrorist plots and capture fugitives, saving countless lives in the 
process. On this basis, it is possible to suggest that interrogational torture could, and 
perhaps should be employed with the intention of obtaining infrastructure intelligence. 
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However, an argument can be made that if ‘the case for torture is simply expanded to allow 
for its use to gather infrastructure intelligence then it can no longer be seen as an 
emergency power’.183 This is because most, if not all, members of a terrorist organisation will 
possess at least some knowledge, however minor, of how the organisation is run. This would 
mean that each and every suspected member of a terrorist organisation could be subjected 
to coercive interrogation on the basis that any infrastructure intelligence that they revealed 
would aid in fighting terrorism. Any pre-existing selective torture power would immediately 
become expansive beyond all parameters. 
Whilst undoubtedly accurate, Rumney’s warning does not detract from the value of 
infrastructure intelligence itself; an expansive torture power would clearly have a disastrously 
negative effect, but that does not mean that such intelligence gained through other means, 
perhaps whilst seeking ticking-bomb intelligence, is not valuable. It is possible to benefit from 
infrastructure intelligence without using it as a justification for a widespread torture power. 
Further, it demonstrates that torture serves a purpose beyond the prevention of imminent 
threats by obstructing terrorist groups in general. 
 
Terrorists Don't Play by the Rules, Why Should We?  
We live in a world where regimes like those previously in place in Iraq and Afghanistan do 
not comply with international laws such as CAT,184 but instead carry out atrocities; gassing 
children and hanging adulterous women.185 A world where Islamic extremists bomb railways 
and fly planes into buildings filled with civilians.186 
In combating terrorism in a world as perilous as this, it is necessary to ensure that society 
does not 'succumb to the utopian illusion that we can prevail while immaculately observing 
every precept of the Sermon on the Mount. It is the necessity of this fallen world that we 
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must oppose evil with force'.187 Surely, where even the remotest of chances exists, that by 
fighting evil with torture, lives could be saved, it becomes acceptable to relax the absolutist 
moral position adopted by many.  
Dratel holds a differing opinion, he proposes that the use of torture degrades society’s 
morals to the point where we are little better than the terrorists whose actions we condemn. 
He maintains that in implementing methods of conquering the threat posed by terrorism, ‘we 
must always be mindful of what differentiates us from the terrorists, and careful to safeguard 
those principles not only in word but in deed. Only fidelity to that doctrine will assure us that 
we are fighting for something worth preserving.'188 Senator John McCain summarises this 
assertion aptly; stating that ‘[t]his is a moral debate. It is about who we are’, not who they 
are.189 
Is it not arguable, however, that states owe their citizens the duty of doing everything in their 
power to protect them; it does not particularly matter ‘who we are’ once your life has been 
destroyed. Rumney responds to this, stating yes, ‘[s]tates have a responsibility to protect 
their own citizens from the threat of terrorist violence… but measures that are either unlawful 
or actually worsen the security situation should… be viewed as unacceptable.’190  Lines must 
be drawn somewhere, otherwise states risk encouraging boundaryless societies in which 
laws are simply viewed as guidelines. The Committee against torture in Israel declare that 
‘[t]his is the destiny of a democracy—it does not see all means as acceptable, and the ways 
of its enemies are not always open before it. A democracy must sometimes fight with one 
hand tied behind its back.’191  
This line of argument, however, arguably falls apart when the abhorrent actions of terrorists 
described above are compared with those associated with the use of torture. Yes, torture is 
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an abhorrent practise, but in no way is it comparable to incidents like 9/11 in which 2,997 
innocent people were killed.192 The two simply cannot be equated. Care should be taken in 
order to ensure society is not left in a position whereby an attack that there was a possibility 
of preventing occurs because we were overly obdurate in our morals. 
 
A Right to Life? 
Reflect upon the following question; certainly, it is immoral to torture someone, but what if it 
was more immoral not to? This proposal can be explored by examining the ticking-bomb 
scenario from a human rights perspective. Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights 1948,193 provides that ‘Everyone has the right to life’. ICCPR, Article 6 states that 
‘Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one 
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.’194 These instruments prescribe that all humans 
possess a legally recognised right to life.195 
It could be argued that if a situation such as the ticking-bomb were allowed to occur, killing 
thousands of people because of a refusal to degrade our morals, that this would entail a 
breach of the right to life of the victims. In order to prevent that from happening, it could be 
suggested that states have a positive obligation to torture a suspect in an attempt to save 
those lives. 
However, the suspect’s human rights must also evidently be considered. Article 5 UDHR and 
Article 7 ICCPR both state that ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.’196 It therefore becomes necessary to weigh one set of 
rights against another. 
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In choosing not to torture the suspect, a country would be implicitly admitting they 
considered the detainee’s Article 5 and 7 rights more valuable than the people’s Article 3 
and 6 rights. As such, they would have neglected their positive obligations under the 
Declaration and Covenant set out above. Krauthammer describes the choice as ‘weighing 
the lesser of two evils: the undeniable inhumanity of torture versus the abdication of the duty 
to protect the victims of a potentially preventable mass murder.’197 
The fictional case of Dirty Harry exemplifies the making of a choice such as this. In this case 
a young girl is kidnapped, buried alive and will suffocate to death if not saved. Police officer 
‘Dirty Harry’ tortures the kidnapper; shooting him in the leg and proceeding to step on the 
wound in order to obtain information regarding the girl’s location. Steinhoff opines that ‘[t]he 
Dirty Harry case… is a case of morally justified torture.’198 The kidnapper has created a 
situation in which either he himself is tortured, or a young girl will be tortured until death.199 ‘It 
is only just and fair that this harm befalls the person responsible for the situation — the 
kidnapper.’200 
But what of the kidnapper’s right not to be tortured? In most circumstances, yes, the 
kidnapper certainly has this right, but not here. His Article 5 and 7 rights, and even his right 
to life, weigh ‘less than the innocent defender’s right to life. The aggressor culpably brings 
about a situation where one of the two — he or the defender — will’201 have their rights 
infringed upon. In situations such as this, it is just that the harm created befall the one who is 
responsible for it; the aggressor. To put it another way, ‘[b]reaking the laws of war and 
abusing civilians are what, to understate the matter vastly, terrorists do for a living.’202 They 
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do not wear uniforms, they hide among civilians, and they deliberately target the innocent. 
As such, ‘they are entitled to no protections whatsoever’;203 they have forfeited their rights. 
The core of the matter rests in the idea that it is ‘not about just anybody’s liberty. It is about 
the liberty of the innocent… The core value of the liberal state is the protection of the liberty 
and… rights of innocent individuals against aggressors’,204 this is a state’s raison d’être. By 
preventing Dirty Harry from torturing the kidnapper, a state would be aiding the aggressor, 
and ignoring the victim; ‘it would help the aggressor’s tyranny over the innocent, therefore 
abetting the relationship it hates the most.’205 
One advantage of maintaining a utilitarianist outlook in situations such as these, is that ‘it 
provides a mechanism for ranking rights and other interests. In the event of a clash, the 
victor is the right that will generate the most happiness.’ 206 For example, based on utilitarian 
morals, the right to life of hundreds of innocents weighs more than a terrorist’s right not to be 
tortured, or even their right to life. This ‘balancing aspect of utilitarianism is the reason that it 
is particularly apposite to determining the circumstances in which torture is appropriate.’207  
When faced with the harrowing duty of having to choose between two evils, it is far better to 
use utilitarianism as a balancing system; choosing the course of action that will protect the 
lives of the greater number of individuals, 208 than to observe the teachings of deontology or 
absolutism; as doing so would result in a lack of action because neither provide a means of 
balancing rights. 
In summary, it is certainly unethical to torture someone, terrorist or not. However, it is 
arguably also unethical to let moral principles condemn thousands of others to a potentially 
avoidable death, especially when the terrorist in question has deliberately brought about the 
situation they find themselves in. In balancing the two, only absolutists find torture 
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inadmissible. As paradoxical as it may appear, it may be posited that forgoing the 
individual’s rights in favour of those of the many is actually the most ethical option. 
 
The Case Against Moral Absolutism 
‘Moral absolutism is the meta-ethical view that some forms of human conduct are right or 
wrong (alternatively, good or evil) in any context. Even for the purpose of doing good, bad 
actions are always bad and cannot be justified’.209 Ariel Dorfman’s unconditional support of 
the absolute prohibition on torture provides a stereotypical example of moral absolutism. He 
states: 
‘I can only pray that humanity will have the courage to say no, no to torture, no to 
torture under any circumstances whatsoever, no to torture, no matter who the 
enemy, what the accusation, what sort of fear we harbour; no to torture no matter 
what kind of threat is posed to our safety; no to torture anytime, anywhere; no to 
torturing anyone; no to torture.210  
This view, however, has come under severe criticism from the judiciary and philosophers 
alike. Steinhoff and Ginbar respectively opine that ‘[m]oral absolutism is a dangerous and 
mistaken view’;211 ‘even in its minimal version, is not easy to defend. It brings to mind… the 
refusal of the Catholic Church to recommend the use of condoms in sub-Saharan Africa, 
even between spouses, as a means of slowing down the catastrophic spread of 
HIV/AIDS.’212 Here, the Catholic Church limited the effectiveness of a widespread, life saving 
measure, based upon the absolute belief that using contraception is sinful. Clearly such 
teaching is dangerous and life threatening.  
Steinhoff explains his belief by way of example; asserting that ‘[i]f, for example, humanity 
would face the choice… between being exterminated or torturing one particularly bad man… 
it is far from clear why any person in his right mind, both intellectually and morally, should 
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pray that humanity said ‘no to torture’’213 As such, Posner describes Dorfman’s rejection of 
torture as ‘not only overwrought in tone but irresponsible in content’.214 Moral absolutism, as 
a concept, is flawed for the simple reason that ‘[c]onsequences count; they cannot simply be 
ignored for the benefit of some allegedly absolute rule, especially if they might be 
catastrophic.’215  
Gross makes the point, that ‘[t]o be a true moral absolutist, one must support a ban on 
torture no matter what, that is, no matter how likely the harm and no matter how great the 
magnitude of that harm.’216 However, when this principle is applied to real life, ‘[m]any who 
support absolute, categorical rights… realize that their position is untenable, not only 
practically but also morally speaking, when applied to such catastrophic cases.’217 Fried, a 
professed anti-utilitarian and human rights professor, suggests that this is perhaps because 
they realise that ‘it seems fanatical to maintain the absoluteness of the judgement, to do right 
even if the heavens will in fact fall.’218 Here, Fried recognises what might be referred to as a 
‘catastrophic exception’ to any general anti-torture argument.  
Moore, a self professed ‘threshold deontologist’, supports the notion of catastrophic 
exceptions. He suggests that ‘deontological norms govern up to a point despite adverse 
consequences; but when the consequences become so dire that they cross the stipulated 
threshold, consequentialism takes over’.219 Moore holds, that ‘consequentialist 
considerations can override deontological judgements under the condition that extremely 
harmful outcomes are inevitable consequences of enacting the alleged duty.’220 That is to 
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say, whilst torture is generally prohibited, when ‘innocent lives are at stake, torturing a 
terrorist is deontologically justified and even morally required.’221  
Cocks, a contributor to a draft of the European Convention of Human Rights, declares that 
‘[a]ll forms of torture, whether inflicted by policy, military authorities [or] members of private 
organisations… are inconsistent with civilised society, are offences against heaven and 
humanity and must be prohibited.’222 Cocks’ moralistic ideal, is to a certain extent accurate; 
torture is without a doubt ‘inconsistent with society’, and it is certainly an ‘offence against 
humanity’, however this does not automatically prohibit it in all circumstances. Herein lays 
the crux of the issue upon which moral absolutism is based; the theory assumes that 
because something is wrong, it absolutely cannot be done, but this is simply not the case. 
For example, it is possible to give an account of the inherent wrongness of torture; it 
‘instrumentalizes the pain and terror of human beings; it involves the deliberate, studied, and 
sustained imposition of pain to the point of agony on a person who is utterly vulnerable… 
and it aims to use that agony to shatter and mutilate the subject’s will’.223 However, giving an 
account which shows that what is inherently wrong may never in any circumstances be done 
is another. ‘Inherently’ does not mean the same as ‘absolutely’.224 Therefore, it is arguable 
that acts classified as ‘inherently wrong’, may still be permissible in specific situations. 
Elshtain, a modern moral philosopher, asserts that a refusal to approve the use of these 
techniques in the aforementioned situations, amounts to ‘a form of moral laziness,’ ‘a 
moralistic code-fetishism,’ or ‘a legalistic version of pietistic rigorism in which one’s own 
moral purity is ranked above other goods.’225 Elshtain paints a self-righteous and egotistical 
picture of the absolutist position. This, however, is an unfair portrayal; the absolutist position 
is dictated by law and convention. The international legal instruments which forbid torture 
‘are public documents; they are not treaties of personal ethics but conventions establishing 
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minimum legal standards for the exercise of state power. As such, they prohibit torture 
categorically and absolutely’.226 
This is certainly the case; the absolutist position is based upon the laws and conventions 
from which the prohibition on torture is formed. Herein lies the problem; ‘a legal prohibition is 
only as strong as the moral and political consensus that supports it’227 and ‘[i]t is not hard to 
make the idea of an absolute prohibition on torture… look silly as a matter of moral 
philosophy.’228 The ticking-bomb theoretical, morally speaking, achieves this 
comprehensively. Once it has been shown that a situation may exist whereby torture can be 
justified, however unrealistic it may be, supporting a morally absolutistic ideal becomes 
somewhat harder. 
A morally absolute outlook on the prohibition of torture would be a desirable ideal if, and only 
if, torture never worked. This, however, is not the case; the horrifying thing about torture is 
that sometimes it does work. ‘In 1994… Israeli corporal Nachshon Waxman was kidnapped 
by Palestinian terrorists. The Israelis captured the driver of the car used in the kidnapping 
and tortured him in order to find where Waxman was being held.’ 229 Yitzhak Rabin, then 
Prime Minister admitted that ‘if the security services had acted according to the guidelines of 
the Landau Report in interrogating Hamas people, they would not have found out the 
location of the kidnappers of Nachshon Waxman.230 
Krauthammer suggests that any politician who finds themselves in a similar position of 
responsibility owes the same obligation as Rabin. To allow the soldier to die would be 
considered a ‘deeply immoral betrayal of soldier and countryman… it [amounts to] a case of 
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moral abdication.’ 231 There is much to admire of those whom on principle refuse to torture, 
regardless of the conditions, ‘[b]ut that does not make… no-torture absolutism, any less a 
form of moral foolishness, tinged with moral vanity. Not reprehensible, only deeply 
reproachable and supremely impracticable.’232 
Krauthammer, like Posner,233 believes that ‘[p]eople who hold such beliefs… [should] not to 
be put in positions of authority. One should be grateful for the saintly among us. And one 
should be vigilant that they [do] not get to make the decisions upon which the lives of others 
depend’.234 There comes a point beyond which blind faith in any absolutist belief is simply 
dangerous; ‘[f]iat justitia, pereat mundus235 is an irrational, and in some cases, immoral 
maxim.’236  
 
Jus bellum iustum (Just War Theory) 
The doctrine of Jus bellum iustum, or Just War theory, aims to ensure that war is morally 
justifiable by providing a series of criteria, all of which must be met for a war to be 
considered just.237 Traditional just war theory divides into three parts: jus ad bellum – the 
justice of resorting to war; just in bello – just conduct in war, and jus post bellum – justice at 
the end of war.238  
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The use of torture primarily relates to the second of these criteria; just in bello, which 
traditionally has been concerned with the treatment of the enemy. It consists of two criteria; 
discrimination and proportionality. The discrimination criterion requires that killing of non-
combatants must be avoided, whilst the proportionality criterion dictates that each action 
must be judged according to the level of force required.239 Majima applies these principles to 
torture, providing a modern perspective. He states that with regard to discrimination: 
Perpetrators, suspects and innocents must be distinguished - torture of the first two 
groups of people is not unconditionally forbidden, although torture of suspects 
should be subject to much stricter conditions and qualifications than that of 
confirmed perpetrators.  However, the last group… should be protected and immune 
from torture under any circumstances.240 
This principle ensures that only confirmed perpetrators, or suspects in extreme 
circumstances, may be subjected to torture, thus safeguarding the innocent from such 
practices. Regarding proportionality, Majima explains that the means used must be 
proportional, that is to say, ‘the specific advantage brought by torture must be proportionate 
to the specific harm caused; appropriate means, methods, duration, intensity, and degree of 
pain, suffering and stress applied must be chosen.’241 This guarantees that only the minimal 
amount of pain necessary is inflicted in order to obtain the required information. 
Majima posits that if, along with a few other conditions he discusses, such as ‘just cause’, 
‘right intention’ and ‘last resort’, ‘a certain kind of torture satisfied [the above mentioned] 
principles, then that kind of torture, could be called ‘just torture’.’242 Such torture would not 
only be justifiable, but in the right conditions, desirable. For example, if proportionate and 
discriminatory243 torture was employed in order to save lives, and as a last resort in a ticking-
bomb scenario, then said torture would undoubtedly be just and certainly preferable to not 
acting. 
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Johnson provides a differing opinion, aligning himself with, and arguing for, a traditionalist’s 
‘just war’ perspective on torture. He opines that ‘most of those making just war claims in 
relation to torture have relied heavily on consequentialist moral reasoning to do so,’244 
leaning on criteria such as last resort and proportionality - which Johnson claims have been 
affixed to the theory only recently245 - to justify torture. Johnson criticises this misuse of the 
theory; explaining that traditional just war ideology: 
yields two very basic and important pieces of moral wisdom… First, there are some 
things that are never to be done; the rules prohibiting direct, intended attacks on 
those not taking part in the use of force extend to the prohibition of torture of 
prisoners. Second, there are some things that a good person may never do; torturing 
involves intentions that are directly contrary to what it means to be a good human 
person.246 
Johnson concludes that, ‘[t]ogether, these implications of just war tradition tell us that torture 
should never be morally allowed’, because it fails to satisfy the condition of jus in bello; that 
is to say, war should be conducted in an ethical manner. It can, however, be argued that this 
is a deontological argument proffered in an era dominated by consequentialist and utilitarian 
opinions, one that has little patience for such deontological absolutes.247  
It is precisely because we live in a modern age that new criteria have been attached to its 
meaning. Wars are no longer fought in the same manner as they were in the eleventh and 
twelfth centuries (the most recent examples that Johnson cites); states must now contend 
with terrorist organisations and the targeting of civilians, as opposed to fighting other states 
on battlefields. Therefore, wars cannot be fought under the same rules just war theory was 
founded and developed upon; as such, it arguably becomes possible to justify torture as a 
method in war. The version of just war ideology that Johnson extensively criticises is simply 
a contemporary adaption of an old theory to new circumstances; a revisionist’s perspective. 
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An Entirely Different Justification for Torture 
If it is accepted that torture is not legal and does not work,248 it raises the question; why do 
states do it?  
Holmes suggests that in some cases governments torture ‘precisely because it defies the 
law’;249 torture is committed not to gain information, but to send a message. States show 
their citizens that they ‘will not be hamstrung by legalisms’,250 that they are prepared to do 
what is ‘necessary’ in order to ensure the public’s safety whilst fighting terrorism. 
This has the additional effect of demonstrating to a state’s enemies that they are willing to do 
anything; it shows them that they are not protected by international laws or civilised 
conventions and thus they fear the state. The January 2002 edition of The Atlantic Monthly 
provides a brutal, yet telling, example of the effectiveness of extreme measures as a means 
of inducing fear, and the positive results this can yield. It contained an account from a Sri 
Lankan army officer, ‘Thomas’: 
Thomas’s unit had apprehended three terrorists who, it suspected, had recently 
planted somewhere in the city a bomb that was then ticking away.... The terrorists—
highly dedicated and steeled to resist interrogation—remained silent.... So Thomas 
took his pistol from his gun belt, pointed it at the forehead of one of them, and shot 
him dead. The other two, he said, talked immediately; the bomb, which had been 
placed in a crowded railway station and set to explode during the evening rush hour, 
was found and defused, and countless lives were saved.251 
In interview, Thomas explained that ‘By going through the process of laws… you cannot fight 
terrorism.’252 But by working outside of the law, by employing extreme measures, he had 
prevented a catastrophe; the fear of death Thomas had induced in the perpetrators 
outweighed any dedication to their cause and brought about a positive result. It is possible to 
apply this principle to torture; it is entirely likely that when faced with the options of being 
tortured or cooperating, terrorists would choose the latter out of fear of the former, allowing 
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crisis to be averted in ticking-bomb situations. Further, torture can act as a deterrent, 
preventing potential terrorists from actually committing acts of terrorism. 
Posner and Vermeule argue that the 'West must project an image of strength as well as 
virtue; undecided Muslims and Arabs will not cast their lot with governments that cannot 
protect themselves and their people’.253 Torture goes a way to presenting this image; it 
demonstrates that governments shall not be restrained by laws or conventions; terrorists will 
not receive protections, or simply be imprisoned after killing the innocent, instead, the state 
will extract what information it deems necessary in order to protect its citizens. 
However, ‘if one were to follow the logic of [this] argument, it could be [suggested] that any 
restraint shown by the state could be seen as weakness’,254 and should therefore be 
avoided. This represents a dangerous thought, for restraint is the defining factor between 
terrorists and those they target, an eroding of the restraints liberal democracies are 
regulated by risks subverting the rule of law; how long before Thomas’ actions are echoed 
on a regular basis. Therefore, states must ensure that they maintain a degree of restraint 
when pursuing high-risk policies such as the use of torture. 
Torture is also seen to offer the opportunity to satiate those who desire revenge; followers of 
retributivism argue that torture’s ‘efficacy, and likewise its popularity, rest in the fact that it 
invariably provides the persecutors with a means of satisfying their call for vengeance.’255 As 
Holmes suggests, this ethos can arguably be seen in the widespread torture employed by 
US forces in retaliation for September 11th: ‘On 9/11, Al-Qaeda gave Americans a burning 
inferno, a taste of Hell. In the torture chambers of Guantánamo Bay and Abu Ghraib, the 
United States returned the favour.’256   
The use of torture, a recognisably barbaric practise, not only reassures a state’s citizens as 
to their resolve, but also strikes fear into the hearts of its enemies and appeases those who 
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demand retribution. For those that hold the above discussed views, such effects lead to 
positive outcomes in the war on terror and thus support its use in this context. 
 
Torture as a Last Resort 
Derk Roeloffsma, editor of the newsletter of the Association of Former US Intelligence 
Officers, states that ‘[t]here is a tragic conflict between the principles by which we wish to live 
together, “with liberty and justice for all,” and the duty and conscience of those who bear 
responsibility for protecting the lives of others.’257 That is to say, whilst in an ideal world 
torture would not be necessary, ‘[e]xtracting information from the enemy is [sometimes] vital 
to the fulfilment of that responsibility’258 
This is why torture, when employed as a last resort, arguably delivers the ‘best of both 
worlds’. Before engaging in coercive practices, all other available methods of obtaining the 
information must be exhausted, thus allowing ‘liberty and justice’ their opportunity to take 
affect and resolve the situation. If, however, they fail, then the ‘duty’ of and ‘responsibility’ for 
protecting the innocent owed by the state replaces these ideals and torture becomes 
permissible. 
Venning takes an opposing position, he believes that ‘God will not allow us to do evil that 
good may come… As pleasing a thing as good is to God, he will not allow us to do the least 
evil for the greatest good… Indeed, it is a damnable doctrine to teach that we may do evil for 
a good end, or that good may come of it.’259 Torture is undoubtedly evil; it ‘is abhorrent. It is 
barbaric and inhumane... It is wrong, self-defeating and poisons the rule of law, replacing it 
with terror.260 Therefore, regardless of the seriousness of the situation, the potentially 
catastrophic consequences associated with choosing not to act, or the likelihood of coercion 
providing a positive outcome, torture remains prohibited. 
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The German Criminal Code, however, suggests differently. The Code offers protection for 
persons who commit unlawful acts in defence of legal interests during extreme 
circumstances and for justifiable reasons. Section 34 reads as follows:  
A person who, faced with an imminent danger to life, limb, freedom, honour, 
property or another legal interest which cannot otherwise be averted, commits an 
act to avert the danger from himself or another, does not act unlawfully, if, upon 
weighing the conflicting interests, in particular the affected legal interests and the 
degree of the danger facing them, the protected interest substantially outweighs the 
one interfered with. This shall apply only if and to the extent that the act committed 
is an adequate means to avert the danger.261 
In summary, there are situations in which illegal actions can be accepted as instrumentally 
adequate reactions. When specifically protected moral or legal interests substantially 
outweigh those infringed upon, and the only means to safeguard these interests from certain 
danger is to act outside of the law, those who do, do not act illegally provided the act 
committed is an acceptable means of averting the danger. When applying this principle to 
torture, it becomes apparent that if the odds are high enough; for example, where a danger 
is ‘imminent’ and ‘cannot otherwise be averted’, any torture employed is done so as a last 
resort measure, and is therefore both legal and justified.262 
Rumney however, warns of the risks involved in using torture on suspected terrorists, even 
as a last resort. ‘What if torture is used and does not work? Is that the end?’263 Or should the 
suspect’s family be tortured? Or even killed? Surely those few lives are not worth more than 
the potential thousands that hang in the balance? He highlights the fact that ‘[t]alk of torture, 
should not be blind to such possibilities. Why would torture of a terrorist suspect be only the 
end and not the beginning of more desperate barbarous acts?’264  
This is an interesting line of reasoning, one designed to induce thought on a ‘what if?’ basis. 
‘What if’ contentions, however, often lack empirical evidence: Rumney’s argument is no 
different; he offers no proof in support of his assertion. Quite the contrary in fact, multiple 
examples of torture’s employment in ‘last resort’ scenarios exist, but not a single one that I 
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have come across gives any mention of coercion extending beyond the initial subject.265 This 
suggests that Rumney’s warning is unfounded, a precautionary prediction at best. Further, if 
viewed from a utilitarian perspective, it changes nothing; if necessary, then sadly yes, an 
argument may be presented for the terrorist’s family to be tortured, and yes, they should be 
killed, a few lives are simply not worth more than those of the thousand, innocent or not.  
Richard Posner, United States Court of Appeals Judge, explains that ‘[o]nly the most 
doctrinaire civil libertarians… deny, that if the stakes are high enough, torture is 
permissible.’266 He continues, stating that ‘[n]o one who doubts that should be in a position of 
responsibility’.267 This is perhaps why ‘[e]ven Senator John McCain, the most vocal of the 
advocates of the recent ‘torture ban,’268 has acknowledged that scenarios such as [those] 
described above constitute an exception to the ban he advocates’.269 He, like Posner, holds 
a position of responsibility, and therefore cannot afford to exhibit ideals such as those shown 
by Venning, even if he himself believes them to be true. Instead, both McCain and Posner 
must represent the middle ground; acknowledging the abhorrent nature of torture, and thus 
campaigning against its use as a general measure, but accepting that in extreme situations, 
torture may need to be employed as a last resort. 
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Chapter Seven: The Torture Debate - The Case Against 
Torture, Trials and Punishment  
The use of torture as a method of trying the accused has long been abandoned in much of 
the world because ‘torture tests endurance, rather than veracity’,270 as such, ‘innocent 
persons might, as one sixteenth-century handbook on criminal procedure warned, yield to 
“the pain and torment and confess things that they never did.”’271  Beccaria’s 1764 work An 
Essay on Crimes and Punishment evidences the author’s bewilderment in relation to the 
idea that ‘pain should be the test of truth, as if truth resided in the muscles and fibres of a 
wretch in torture.’272 Beccaria explains that ‘[b]y this method, the robust will escape, and the 
feeble be condemned. These are the inconveniences of this pretended test of truth’.273 
Further, it is impossible for the persecuted individual to be proved innocent, or it be 
confirmed that they do not possess the desired information as a result of torture,274 meaning 
that the process can go on indefinitely without producing any results. It is therefore not 
unreasonable to draw the conclusion that torture, when used in the context of trials, is not 
only ineffective in revealing the truth, but lacks the capability to differentiate between the 
innocent and guilty. This is arguably why torture is no longer used during trials. 
Torture, however, is sadly still used as a form of punishment.275 Scott suggests that 
punishing ‘brutality with an equal measure of brutality is indefensible. It is always evil. it 
cannot have anything but evil effects’,276 for ‘[t]he moment punishment becomes excessive it 
leads to an extension of crime rather than to its suppression.’277 If a criminal knows that they 
will face torture as a form of punishment if found guilty of a crime, they may go to greater 
lengths to avoid capture; they may commit further crimes, potentially ones far graver than 
                                            
270
 John H Langbein, ‘The Legal History of Torture’ in Stanford Levinson (ed), Torture: A Collection 
(Oxford University Press 2004) 93; see also Joost Damhouder, Practique iudiciaire es causes 
criminelles [Praxis Rerum Criminalium] (Antwerp 1564) 44.    
271
 ibid 44.    
272
 Cesare Beccaria, An Essay on Crimes and Punishment (1764) Chapter 16. 
273
 ibid. 
274
 George Riley Scott, A History of Torture (1995 edn, Senate 1940) 31. 
275
 Please see ‘Chapter Four: Torture Across the World’. 
276
 George Riley Scott, A History of Torture (1995 edn, Senate 1940) 33. 
277
 ibid 398. 
 
Chapter Seven: The Torture Debate - The Case Against 
51 
 
that originally perpetrated. Thus, because torture is an excessive punishment, its 
employment may inadvertently lead to additional criminal activity. 
So far, the discussion in this section has focussed upon the use of torture during the trials 
and punishment of suspected terrorists. However, those who administer torture, and the 
officials and executives that authorise it, may also face trial in order to ensure that their 
actions are justified. Levinson states that ‘[i]f one is truly committed to the absolutism set 
forth in the United Nations Convention, torture would… have to be a strict liability offence; 
any variation on punishment, based on level of culpable evil, takes away from the element of 
strict liability’278 embodied in the Convention.  
Therefore, any breach must be punished in strict accordance with the Convention, that is to 
say, ‘[n]o exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, 
internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification 
of torture.’279 Regardless of circumstance, and irrespective of justification, those found guilty 
will be held strictly liable for their actions. 
An argument could be made that the Convention represents an excessively stringent and 
unreasonable approach to punishing the use of torture; mitigating circumstances are taken 
into account in other areas of law, why is torture any different? Yes, officials should be held 
accountable and brought to trial where necessary, but circumstances, justifications and 
consequences should not be ignored in any situation. If this were to be allowed to happen, it 
is entirely possible that a ticking-bomb-like scenario could occur, in which a well-meaning 
and arguably justified torturer ends up being punished for saving thousands of lives; few 
would describe this as fair. 
Levinson, however, details the logic behind maintaining a strict liability status for torture. He 
explains that ‘[o]nce one decides to listen to the torturer’s story, as well as that of the person 
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tortured, one enters into a far more complicated moral and legal universe.’280 But this is 
precisely the point; the world is, morally and legally speaking, already complex. As such, it is 
more reasonable and pragmatic to take into account all factors when determining guilt in 
court, than to cultivate a system governed by black or white absolutes, that disregards highly 
significant determinants, in vitally important cases. 
In Barzilai v Government of Israel,281 Justice Ben-Porat of the Israeli Supreme Court states 
that ‘[t]here simply are cases in which those who are at the helm of the state, and bear 
responsibility for its survival and security, regard certain deviations from the law for the sake 
of protecting the security of the state, as an unavoidable necessity.’282 If one were to adhere 
to the strict liability embodied in the Convention, officials acting in defence of their citizens 
would not be able to make the deviations necessary in order to maintain security without fear 
of the ramifications. Even in situations where they are certain beyond reasonable doubt that 
their actions are justified, where lives will be saved as a result of their conduct, officials must 
account for the fact that they will face incarceration as a consequence of their choice, such is 
the nature of strict liability. It is somewhat absurd to knowingly place an individual in this 
position; one in which they are damned if they do, and damned if they do not. 
Posner suggests that ‘trusting executive officials to break [the rules when] the stakes are 
high enough to enable the officials to obtain political absolution for their illegal conduct’283 
could provide a working solution. Doing so would allow those in positions of responsibility to 
make the rare but unavoidable decisions where necessary, such as employing torture when 
justified, without fear of being imprisoned, but would still hold them accountable for their 
decisions. 
This concept, however, presents its own set of problems. Those who torture, especially in 
the name of the state, are rarely punished. They ‘cannot be reduced to the obvious ‘sadists’ 
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one would, for moral clarity’s sake, like them to be’284 because they believe what they are 
doing is justified. Torturers often ‘view themselves as servants of a state fighting a just war… 
the alleged torturers will often be able to sincerely argue – in front of jurors or judges far 
more inclined to identify with them than with the tortured285 – that they believed they were 
acting to protect society.’286 Few judges or juries would find those who they understand to be 
acting in the interests of their state guilty. Therefore, allowing any deviation from the strict 
liability expressed in the Convention undermines its purpose; it allows the potential for those 
who commit or order torture to avoid justice in situations where their actions were not 
justified. 
 
A Legal Context 
Luban, like Bilder,287 also criticises the Bybee memo, stating:  
Office of Legal Counsel lawyers simply discarded the project of providing an 
impartial analysis of the law… Instead they substituted a rethinking of standard legal 
doctrines based on the liberal ideology of torture – the idea that torture to obtain 
information useful for national defence is not impermissible.288  
This is at odds with the role the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC)289 are supposed to fulfil; they 
exist to advise the government by providing a nonpartisan evaluation of the relevant law, not, 
to formulate legal justifications safeguarding a policy the Bush administration wished to 
implement. Dorf accuses the OLC of ‘turning intellectual somersaults to find loopholes and 
excuses for the commission of what a lay observer would surely consider torture.’290 He, like 
Luban, is of the opinion that instead of taking a nonbiased approach in assessing the legality 
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of torture, the OLC adopted the mindset that torture was a necessity and aimed their advice 
at justifying it, clearly serving the Administration’s objectives; ‘In effect, they were writing an 
advocacy document for a pro-torture conclusion, in order to give those who order or engage 
in torture legal cover.’291  
In failing to provide an impartial evaluation, the OLC only considered the legal arguments 
supporting torture. Zelikow opines that ‘[w]here there should have been detailed papers of 
policy analysis, there were detailed papers of legal analysis.’292 The OLC chose to debate 
the issue of what ‘could’ be done as a matter of law, instead of carefully inventorying prior 
US and foreign experience in detention practices and interrogations, to allow the answering 
of the question, what ‘should’ be done.293 This therefore brings into questions the legitimacy 
of the Bybee memo and perhaps explains why it was replaced with the Levin memo. 
Torture breaches the Geneva Conventions, CAT, the US Code,294 UDHR, ICCPR,295 and 
pursuant to Article 2(2) CAT,296 is illegal in all circumstances. Beneath these explicit legal 
prohibitions against torture there lay more intricate legal assertions opposing its use. 
When considered as a corporal principle, pain is linked directly with punishment.297 The act 
of torture clearly inflicts pain and thus can be considered a punishment. The longstanding 
principle of law, ‘the presumption of innocence’, dictates that ‘Everyone charged with a 
criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to 
law.’298  
Cesare Beccaria outlines this axiom in his 1794, Crimes and Punishment. He warns that 
‘[n]o man can be judged until he is found guilty; nor can society take from him the public 
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protection, until it have been proved that he has violated the conditions on which it was 
granted… in the eye of the law, every man is innocent, whose crimes have not been 
proved.’299 Applying this, it becomes clear that the state can only punish someone after first 
proving that they have committed a crime. However, in many cases, such as those in Abu 
Ghraib, the detainees being tortured had not been charged with a crime, let alone found 
guilty of one. 
The use of torture in such a manner amounts to an assumption of the suspect’s guilt, or their 
possession of knowledge; the individual is being punished by the state in absence of any 
legal process, without a trial, and without being given the opportunity to mount a defence.  
Rather than using evidence that has already been gathered to justify punishment, 
punishment is instead used to gather evidence to justify the punishment already inflicted. 
The performance of such sanctions without confirmation of guilt demonstrates the 
application of an anti-legal principle that quite flagrantly jettisons the rule of law.300 
In the aftermath of the Abu Ghraib scandal, legislation establishing US opposition to torture 
was approved, with ‘Congress attempt[ing] to legislate a solution to the issue of detainee 
abuse and torture by passing the Detainee Treatment Act 2005.’301 The Act affirmed the 
legal prohibitions on torture by confining interrogators to methods listed in the US Army Field 
Manual;302 as such it confirmed the legal restrictions on torture. 
The Act has, however, come under criticism. Sulemen labels it a ‘feeble and incongruous 
attempt to restore America’s credibility as a country that does not practice or condone 
torture’.303 Be that as it may, the enactment of such legislation clearly demonstrates an 
attempt to recapitulate the fact that torture is illegal above and beyond the existing legal 
prohibitions and therefore should not happen. 
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The Ticking Time-Bomb  
The 'ticking time-bomb' hypothetical involves posing an ethical quandary: ‘suppose that a 
perpetrator of an imminent terrorist attack, that will kill many people, is in the hands of the 
authorities and that he will disclose the information needed to prevent the attack only if he is 
tortured. Should he be tortured?’304 
The theory creates ‘doubt about the wisdom of the absolute prohibition of torture’;305 if a 
prohibitionist concedes that the perpetrator should be tortured then they have accepted that 
there is an exception to the legal prohibition and that their opposition to torture is not based 
on principle.306 On a broader basis, demonstrating that torture is acceptable in ‘ticking-bomb’ 
scenarios changes the discussion from ‘is torture justifiable?’ to ‘in what circumstances is 
torture justifiable?’ By acknowledging an exemption from the prohibition, a prohibitionist has 
already established that torture is justifiable in some circumstances, to paraphrase George 
Bernard Shaw; all that’s left to do is haggle over the price.307 
The obvious answers, to a utilitarian at least, would be ‘yes’ and in ones such as this; 
inflicting pain on one man is clearly justifiable in order to save thousands of lives. However, 
this view is not shared by the public. A study carried out by the BBC World Service in 2006 
found that when faced with the ‘time-bomb' problem, 59%308 of the world's citizens said 'no' 
to compromising on the protection of human rights.309  This demonstrates the public's stance 
against torture, even where hypothetically guaranteed to produce results. As the public are 
unwilling to support the use of torture, it suggests that it cannot be justifiable.  
It is, however, intriguing to consider what percentage of the participant’s actions would 
reflect their answers when placed into a real life situation, one in which people's lives were at 
stake. It is often easy to take the moral high ground when merely faced with hypothetical 
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situations. This is exactly the point though; the poll asked whether the government should be 
authorised to use some degree of torture in general ticking-bomb scenarios, not on whether, 
given extreme and personalised circumstances, they themselves would resort to torture. The 
laws surrounding torture should be made and enforced by those distanced from the events 
precisely because they have the ability to remain impartial; their judgements have not been 
affected by external factors, allowing them to make morally sound choices. It has been 
objectively determined that torture is illegal by state officials and it is on this basis that the 
public voted. 
Interestingly, the BBC’s study also found that ‘support for using torture is generally greatest 
in those countries that see themselves as actively engaged in a struggle against political 
violence’.310 For example, 36% of Americans believed that some degree of torture should be 
allowed,311 perhaps reflecting the ‘pro’ torture mentality adopted by the Bush administration 
in the wake of 9/11. 
Jeremy Bentham, widely regarded as the founder of modern utilitarianism, offers a rather 
different viewpoint. Bentham states: ‘To say nothing of wisdom, could any pretence be made 
so much as to the praise of blind and vulgar humanity, by the man who to save one criminal, 
should determine to abandon a 100 innocent persons to the same fate?’312 From a 
utilitarian’s perspective, and presumably many others whom would not label themselves as 
such, this quote rings true; it makes no sense, morally or logically, to value the life of one 
criminal over the lives of one-hundred innocents, arguably making the choice to torture the 
criminal, an obvious one for an individual to make. 
This, however, is precisely the point, the state is not any one man; it represents the nation, 
and as such, does not have the luxury of making private morality decisions, however logical 
they may appear to be. Instead, the state must make decisions based upon public morality 
applied on a wide-scale basis, and taken from predetermined laws. There is a key difference 
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between an individual exercising private morality by making a choice they deem to be right; 
torturing the ticking-bomb terrorist, and a state torturing the ticking-bomb terrorist. An 
individual can make private morality decisions because they are not responsible for, and 
held accountable to, the public at large, whereas the state is. ‘The distinction is not between 
what is moral and what is lawful, but between what is moral for a state to do and what is 
moral for an individual to do.’313 As such, leaders confronting a ticking-bomb situation must 
work within the boundaries set by society through its institutions, rather than stepping 
outside any boundaries in such situations. To do so would be to endorse torture.314 
In summary: 
[i]ndividuals, even individuals who happen to be state officials, may take it upon 
themselves to use [coercive] methods, and they may turn out to have been morally 
justified. But the state itself in what it legally authorizes, in contrast to what individual 
officials may take upon themselves to do, may not.315  
This is because public morality must be based entirely upon what is legal; by torturing the 
terrorist, the state is exercising private morality in a public sphere; it is choosing to do what it 
deems to be right, instead of adhering to the laws it exists to uphold. In making decisions 
based upon private morality, the state is not only failing to uphold the standards set by the 
law,316 but ultimately precipitating the corruption of the rule of said law.317 
Steinhoff submits that, ‘[w]hat is [most] frightening about such a brutalisation of the legal 
system is that it is also the brutalisation of its enforcer — which, [here] is the state.’318 
Indeed, ‘[t]orture is seen as characteristic not of free, but of tyrannical governments’,319 
therefore, allowing the state to legally institutionalise torture in certain circumstances 
undermines trust in the government; those institutions that previously represented safety and 
protection, instead serve to administer pain and suffering. 
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On the other hand, it can be argued that ‘states have a positive moral duty to protect their 
citizens – this is perhaps the modern democratic state’s raison d'être.’320 If a state exists 
primarily for the purposes of protecting and serving its people, then perhaps it is obligated to 
adopt the policy that helps the most people,321 regardless of any breach in law this may lead 
to. The state may be required to abandon its deontological rules-based system, and instead 
make decisions based upon the consequences the actions affect, rather than on the actions 
themselves. 
Regardless of the moral and ethical reasoning that surrounds the ticking-bomb scenario, 
there exists several empirical flaws with the hypothetical. The scenario creates an 
impression of certainty. This is misleading;322 the world of torture operates on imperfect 
knowledge and ambiguity, it can never be known with certainty, for example, that torturing a 
suspect would be guaranteed to stop the explosion. Such criticisms are largely referred to as 
‘Artificial Cases Objections’. 
This line of argument ‘typically involves pointing out how deeply artificial the case is’.323 Shue 
‘argues that the hypothetical is misleading because it is ‘idealized’, in that it assumes inter 
alia that authorities have detained a terrorist with life saving information and that [torture will 
provide] a timely disclosure of this information.’324  In the hypothetical, ‘[t]he proposed victim 
of our torture is not someone we suspect of planting the device: he is the perpetrator… The 
wiring is not backwards, the mechanism is not jammed: the device will destroy the city if not 
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deactivated.’325 In addition to the above problems, ‘we must also know how to torture the 
perpetrator, that torture will be effective, that it will not take more time than is available’.326 
The hypothetical presents an overly simplistic set of circumstances by creating the allusion 
that these elements are certain, in doing so, it aims to convince its readers that making a 
pro-torture choice is justifiable. However, when the hypothetical is considered logically, it 
becomes clear that these elements are far from certain. How is it possible to know that the 
bomb is wired correctly, and that the detainee is guilty of placing it? Further, given the 
questionable efficacy of torture, there is no guarantee that torture will even work, yet the 
hypothetical assumes these aspects are fact. Wisnewski makes the point, that if the 
authorities possessed this knowledge, it must have been acquired in some way. After all, 
‘[h]ow could we have the knowledge in question… unless we saw the bomb being wired, and 
then saw the perpetrator place it? If we have seen these things… there would be no need to 
torture.’327 It is therefore not only arguable that the assumptions upon which the hypothetical 
is based are ‘empirically impossible’,328 but that these same assumptions defeat it by the 
means of basic logic.  
The fact of the matter is, the Ticking-Bomb Hypothetical, or as Mathews describes it, ‘The 
Unreality Thesis’,329 fails to recognise the reality of the world in which it exists; certain 
knowledge of the above discussed factors is impossible, and if it were possible, as the 
hypothetical seems to suggest, torture would not be necessary. As such, Shue contends that 
the choice presented in the hypothetical is so unlike the circumstances of an actual choice 
as to make it a ‘disastrously misleading analogy from which to derive conclusions about 
reality.’330 
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Elsewhere Shue asserts that, 
there is a saying in jurisprudence that hard cases make bad law, and there might 
well be one in philosophy that artificial cases make bad ethics. If the example is 
made sufficiently extraordinary, the conclusion that torture is permissible is secure. 
But one cannot easily draw conclusions for ordinary cases from extraordinary ones, 
and as the situations described become more likely, the conclusion that torture is 
permissible becomes more debatable.331  
The situation presented by the hypothetical is certainly extraordinary, one carefully designed 
in such a manner as to ensure that a pro-torture conclusion is reached. Yet one cannot 
expect a verdict that is arrived at as a result of facts that are ‘completely divorced from 
reality’,332 to be applied to normalised cases. 
Gross, however, suggests differently; he explains that the problem with such lines of thinking 
‘lies in the fact that ticking-bomb cases are not ‘artificial’. They are real, albeit rare. Ignoring 
them completely, by rhetorically relegating them to the level of ‘artificial,’ is utopian or naive, 
at best.’333 Gross highlights the difference between ‘ignoring completely the truly 
catastrophic cases and focusing our attention elsewhere when designing general rules and 
policies.’334 It is possible to acknowledge, consider and prepare for rare and extreme cases, 
without tainting the more general approach taken to torture policy. 
Like Gross, Wisnewski and O’Donohue et al, contend that the purpose of the ticking-bomb 
hypothetical, ‘is not to justify a national program of torture but to emphasize that there are 
exceptions to every general rule.’335 In this way, the hypothetical acts as an ‘intuition pump; 
something that allows us to assess whether or not we actually believe that torture is 
impermissible.’336 If it is established that this is not the case, the conditions under which 
torture is acceptable may be discussed. Put simply, it is not possible to ‘convincingly argue 
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that torture in general is morally permissible. The ticking-bomb dilemma is merely a thought 
exercise designed to demonstrate that these exceptions [can] occur, even in relation to such 
fundamental values as those protecting the rights of the detainee.’337 Thus, even if a 
situation identical to that of the ticking-bomb hypothetical never arises, exploring such a 
possibility is beneficial because it allows for a better understanding and expression of our 
intuitions regarding torture.338 
On a different note, the argument can be made that torture should not be viewed as a one-
off decision as depicted in the ticking-bomb example. It cannot simply be decided to torture 
someone once and expect to be rewarded with the information desired. Torture goes on for 
weeks, months and varies in degrees of brutality. There is no one-off decision; decisions are 
made at every juncture regarding duration and severity. Torture must be treated, and thus 
presented, as the practice it is, rather than the one some may like it to be. 
As such, instead of weighing one guilty man’s pain against hundreds of innocent lives, the 
certainty of anguish produced by torture with the mere possibility of learning something vital 
from it should be compared.339 Upon doing this, it becomes very hard to consider the ticking-
bomb scenario a viable justification for the use of torture. 
Dratel makes the additional point that in a more realistic context, that of the Iraq and Afghan 
wars, 'the "ticking time-bomb" rationale ignores the fact that the torture approved occurred 
well after the detainees' apprehension, and continued for months, if not years, thereafter’;340 
meaning any time-bomb would have detonated long before any torture occurred, or 
intelligence extracted, thus making any torture performed entirely pointless. 
Even if a situation such as that described in the hypothetical were to arise, there is evidence 
to suggest that torturing the terrorist would not elicit the information necessary in order to 
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stop the attack. Jose Rodriguez, former director of the CIA’s Clandestine Service, revealed 
that the application of EITs took ‘as little as seven to at most less than thirty days’341 to 
produce useful information. This ‘demonstrates that EITs did not elicit valuable information 
quickly… [therefore] the ticking bomb scenario of a threatened imminent attack loses much 
of its justification.’342  
Opponents of legalisation point out that the ticking-bomb hypothetical assumes that torture 
will work in eliciting life-saving intelligence, but such an assumption ‘is both over-simplistic 
and over-optimistic’,343 primarily because there is little evidence to suggest that torture is 
effective. 
 
The Questionable Efficacy of Torture 
Many of the arguments outlined in the ‘Torture: The Case For’ section above assume that 
coercive interrogational practices are guaranteed to produce results; they focus upon the 
moral and legal aspects of the debate, whilst ignoring those based upon logic and 
empiricism; they overlook what is arguably the most important factor; whether torture 
actually works. If it could be demonstrated that it does not, then the majority of the 
arguments supporting torture may be rendered obsolete. Goldman summarises that the 
issue of the effectiveness of enhanced interrogation is central to public debate on torture, 
because ‘apologists often assume that torture works, and all that is left is the moral 
justification. [However] If torture does not work, then their apology is irrelevant’,344 as the 
practise is, from a practical perspective, pointless. 
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In general, coercive interrogation is not effective, nor does it produce positive results. By way 
of example, James Corum, a professor at the US Army Command and General Staff College 
states, ‘the torture of suspects [at Abu Ghraib] did not lead to any useful intelligence 
information being extracted.’345 
The main criticisms regarding torture’s ineffectiveness date back to the time of Aristotle.346 
He opined that those tortured ‘are as likely to give false evidence as true, some being ready 
to endure everything rather than tell the truth, while others are equally ready to make false 
charges against others, in the hope of being sooner released from torture.’347 Langbein goes 
as far as to say that ‘[h]istory’s most important lesson is that it has not been possible to 
make coercion compatible with truth.’348 For example, someone experiencing the extreme 
pain of torture is likely to fabricate information simply to put a stop to the pain.349 
Alternatively, they may deliberately reveal false information in order to mislead the 
interrogator. Cicero summarised that ‘examination under torture is… tainted by hope, 
invalidated by fear… [with] no room left for the truth.’350 
This opinion is shared by Rowell, a C.I.D. agent with 36 years experience. He believes that 
‘the use of force or humiliation with prisoners is invariably counterproductive. “They’ll tell you 
what you want to hear, truth or no truth… You don’t get righteous information,”’351 
demonstrating that this criticism remains relevant today. 
Rowell’s views are mirrored in the CIA’s Human Resources Exploitation Training 
Programme. According to the programme, ‘[e]xperience indicates that the use of force is not 
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necessary to gain cooperation of sources, use of force is a poor technique, yields unreliable 
results, may damage subsequent collection efforts, and can induce the source to say what 
he thinks the interrogator wants to hear.’352 Further, CIA documentation teaches that 
‘[i]ntense pain is quite likely to produce false confessions, concocted as a means of escaping 
from distress. A time-consuming delay results, while investigation is conducted and the 
admissions are proven untrue.’353 
If the notion that torture is performed with the aim of obtaining information, rather than 
serving a more worryingly sadistic purpose, is accepted, then the acquiring of accurate 
information becomes its key objective. However, following the evidence presented above, 
torture often produces unreliable intelligence, suggesting that it fails to fulfil its most 
important and arguably only justifiable function; thus rendering it pointless.  
However, Rumney explains that ‘[t]here can be little doubt that interrogational torture does 
sometimes work to produce disclosures. To suggest otherwise indicates an unwillingness to 
seriously engage with the evidence provided by the historic and contemporary literature.’354 
As Krauthammer notes, ‘It may indeed be true that torture is not a reliable tool. But that is 
very different from saying that it is never useful.’355 
A real life example of the effective use of torture was evidenced in 1995, when an Al-Qaeda 
plot to bomb 11 US planes was prevented using information extracted through torture from a 
Pakistani suspect. ‘For weeks, agents hit him with a chair and a long piece of wood, forced 
water into his mouth, and crushed lighted cigarettes into his private parts… His ribs were 
almost totally broken and his captors were surprised he survived.’356 
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Taken at face value, this example clearly appears to support the argument that torture can 
produce results, making it justifiable in extremes. However, if the situation is examined a little 
closer; ‘The… agents were surprised he survived – in other words they came close to 
torturing him to death before he talked.’357 What if he had not known about the plot or if it 
had not even existed? They could have tortured him to death for nothing. As Luban asserts, 
‘[y]ou can’t use the argument that preventing the Al-Qaeda attack justified the decision to 
torture, because at the moment the decision was made no one knew about the… attack.’358  
It may therefore be submitted that one exceptionally rare example of torture producing a 
positive result cannot be used to justify its widespread use, especially when there is no way 
of knowing beforehand whether torture will result in a positive outcome. 
Neurologist Lawrence Hinkle offers an alternate criticism; he details the frailty of the mind 
under bodily assault. He states: 
The human brain, the repository of the information that the interrogator seeks, 
functions optimally within the same narrow range of physical and chemical 
conditions that limit the functions of human organs in general.... Any circumstance 
that impairs the function of the brain potentially affects the ability to give information 
as well as the ability to withhold it.359 
Therefore, torture, clearly a practice that impairs the function of the brain due to its effect on 
the body, may be as likely to prevent information being provided, as to yield it. If this is true, 
then coercive interrogation may actually work contrary to its supposed purpose. 
The CIA’s KUBARK manual suggests that this is certainly the case, but for different reasons. 
It states that ‘most people underestimate their capacity to withstand pain… In general direct 
physical brutality creates only resentment, hostility, and further defiance.’360 This echoes 
Bentham, who observed that, ‘anger mixing itself with the sensation of pain will have a 
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peculiar tendency to give force to obstinacy’,361 thus resulting in the withholding of 
information, rather than the offering of it. 
Farrall notes that coercive interrogation may be of limited use in the case of Al-Qaeda 
because it ‘is not a traditional hierarchical organisation… and it does not exercise full 
command and control over its branch and franchises’.362 Instead, Al-Qaeda ‘operates a 
devolved network hierarchy’, whereby ‘Al-Qaeda’s core members focus on exercising 
strategic command and control to ensure the centralization of the organization’s actions and 
message, rather than directly managing its branch and franchises.’363 As a result, the various 
branches of Al-Qaeda operate largely independently, meaning very few Al-Qaeda operatives 
possess knowledge beyond that which is immediately relevant to them. Therefore, 
irrespective of torture’s effectiveness, in the case of Al-Qaeda, the potential to gain 
intelligence via the use of torture is somewhat limited because most members simply will not 
possess the sought after knowledge. 
Given the overwhelming degree of criticism made regarding the effectiveness of torture, both 
ancient and modern, and from a wide range of sources, the few rare cases in which coercive 
techniques have resulted in the timely obtaining of genuinely valuable information do not 
serve to justify its use. In general, as means of obtaining information, torture is ineffective. 
 
Other Methods of Interrogation are More Effective 
Whilst it may be true that coercive interrogation has produced actionable intelligence on 
occasion, this does not mean that alternative interrogational methods could not have been 
just as, or more, effective. Proponents of coercive interrogation ‘have not provided a shred of 
evidence that physical force is the only or the most effective means to prevent attacks.’364 It 
is not enough to represent a few isolated cases in which the Security Services, after using 
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force during interrogations, succeeded in preventing terrorist attacks, because we do not 
know what the results would have been had other methods been used instead.365 
Alexander Mathew, a US army interrogator who served seventeen years, provides the 
perfect example of the efficacy of alternative methods of interrogation. Mathew was tasked 
with obtaining intelligence allowing US forces to ‘find Abu Musab al-Zarqawi366 and kill 
him’.367 By employing traditional interrogational techniques, Mathew was successful; using 
‘respect, rapport, hope, cunning and deception’ to find Zarqawi’s location.368 The fact that 
this was possible without the use of torture, demonstrates that traditional interrogational 
methods can be effective, this therefore begs the question; why is torture necessary? 
Former FBI interrogator Ali Soufan insists that it is not. He states, by way of example, that 
the actionable intelligence provided by Abu Zubaydah was the result of traditional 
interrogation methods. ‘There was’, he concluded, ‘no actionable intelligence gained from 
using enhanced interrogation techniques on Zubaydah that wasn’t, or couldn’t have been, 
gained from regular tactics.’369 If this is the case, then why was Zubaydah subjected to 
copious amounts of waterboarding and sleep deprivation,370 the infliction of pain and 
suffering served no purpose and perhaps delayed the obtaining of what information he did 
provide. To this end, the torturing of Zubaydah was nothing but counterproductive. 
Mathew supports this suggestion, stating that abuse and torture ‘slows the progress of the 
interrogation or results in bad information’.371 He instead proposes the use of non-coercive 
techniques, such as the rapport building method. The Intelligence Science Board details 
that: 
Rapport usually begins to develop during conversation — maybe even “small talk” 
— and serves at least two functions. First, research studies say, it helps to “induce” 
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or facilitate compliance with subsequent requests — and gets the source talking. 
Second, it allows the educer to identify and assess potential motivations, interests, 
and vulnerabilities.372  
It could be argued that, due to the reactions that torture generates in those subjected to it, in 
that pain alone often makes them numb and unresponsive, techniques such as rapport 
building that build a relationship with the detainee and engage their minds,373 are much more 
likely to produce accurate information. 
However, Rumney explains that ‘there are fundamental problems with such comparative 
claims.’374 He states that ‘[t]here are no scientific studies in which such techniques have been 
compared’;375 perhaps due to the fact that claims of success ‘can rarely be tested in a 
controlled environment’ due to the nature of torture.376 Therefore, claims such as these must 
be treated with caution; although they may appear accurate, following patterns of logic, there 
is no empirical evidence to support them. It must also be noted that, even if it were possible 
to accurately test these claims, the results would not yield the answer to the underlying moral 
and legal question being asked; ‘what should be done where non-coercive techniques have 
been tried, have failed and interrogational torture is the last remaining option for 
interrogators.’377 At some point, this question must be answered; simply arguing that non-
coercive techniques are more effective than coercive ones serves no purpose in this regard. 
Suedfeld states that ‘[i]t is true that information elicited under torture may not be truthful; but 
that is true of all information provided by suspects. There is no evidence that torture results 
in less truthful confessions than other methods of interrogation.’378 Whilst this may be 
accurate, other methods of interrogation do not give rise to the same negative ramifications 
as torture. Sullivan suggests that, ‘[w]hat miniscule intelligence we might have plausibly 
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gained from torturing and abusing detainees is vastly outweighed by the intelligence we 
have forfeited by alienating many otherwise sympathetic Iraqis and Afghans’.379 The fact of 
the matter is, rapport building and other non-coercive interrogational techniques, regardless 
of their debatable effectiveness, do not inflict irreparable damage on those involved, do not 
undermine trust in the West resulting in violent backlashes, and do not breach any of the 
numerous prohibitions on torture. Coercive interrogation on the other hand, most certainly 
does. As such, when the overall effects are considered; both immediate and lasting, it is 
possible to argue that due to their law of drawbacks, non-coercive techniques are more 
effective than coercive ones. 
 
The Wrong Man Problem 
‘If the suspect is indeed the terrorist who has endangered innocent peoples’ lives, fairness 
dictates that he will be the one to pay the costs for dealing with that danger.’380 But what if he 
is not? The ‘wrong man problem’ is self explanatory; what if the suspect being tortured is not 
a terrorist, or is, but does not possess the sought-after knowledge? In cases such as these, 
the wrong man is being tortured; this mistake not only gives effect to the numerous adverse 
affects of torture, but fails to deliver results whilst doing so. 
Rodriguez has suggested that this dilemma could be avoided by restricting the use of 
enhanced interrogational techniques to situations in which the detainee was not cooperating, 
and was lying. However, it is difficult to detect lying if the interrogator does not know the 
answer to the question they are asking. Pfiffner points out that this could easily lead to the 
infliction of EITs on people who genuinely do not know the answers to the questions they are 
asked.381 For example, the CIA thought that Abu Zubaydah was the number three leader in 
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Al-Qaeda, but he turned out to be a travel co-ordinator.382 Zubaydah would have been 
interrogated on the assumption that he possessed more information than he in fact held; 
asked questions to which he did not know the answers. Thus, he may have been 
waterboarded based on the belief that he was lying, when in fact he was cooperating, 
making the entire process pointless. 
Bagaric and Clarke state that ‘[t]he main general argument against utilitarianism is that 
because it prioritizes net happiness over individual pursuits, it fails to safeguard fundamental 
individual interests. As a result, it has been argued that in some circumstances utilitarianism 
leads to horrendous outcomes’,383 such as the torturing of innocents in wrong man 
scenarios. However, it is also arguable, that ‘[t]he interests of the society may sometimes be 
so deeply involved as to make it right to punish an innocent man ‘that the whole nation 
perish not’.384 That is to say, there are situations where the general interests of society 
outweigh the duty to respect individual rights; conditions in which it is necessary to risk 
torturing the innocent in order to protect the general public. 
Yet the trade-off being made is not quite that simple. Certainly, if torturing the innocent were 
guaranteed to protect society; to stop the ticking-bomb as it were, a strong case could be 
made on utilitarian grounds that pursuing such courses of action were justified. But that is 
precisely the point, the outcome is not guaranteed; torture does not always work. Utilitarian 
beliefs such as these not only risk torturing the innocent, but do so based on the knowledge 
and understanding that torture may not be effective. Thus, justifications based on utilitarian 
morals often overlook the uncertainty of torture, portraying its use as a simple trade-off, 
when in reality, such justifications are founded on the mere chance that torture is successful; 
the image that should be depicted is that of a gamble.  
Both objectively and subjectively, torture is an atrocious practice. As such, torture should not 
be used unless there is ‘a very good chance indeed of knowing what you are doing. But in 
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any real case where torture is in question, you cannot have a good chance of knowing what 
you are doing.’385 Based on this analysis, torture should never be used. Consequentialists, 
however, argue ‘that at least where the question is one of policy and the stakes are high, a 
state may justifiably do ‘terrible things’ even without a good chance of knowing whether each 
one of them is justified, as long as the overall result is that thousands of lives are saved.’386 
Therefore, in circumstance such as those described above, torture would be justified, so 
long as it saved the lives of innocents. 
Ginbar identifies this as ‘an admission… that unjustified torture is inherent in the very 
decision to adopt torture as a matter of policy, so that even strict adherence to instructions 
and restrictions would result in a toss-of-the-dice mixture of unjustified and justified 
torture.’387 By adopting a policy such as this, states essentially acknowledge that the 
justifiability of torture is determined on a case-by-case basis by its effectiveness. Torture that 
is effective and saves lives is justified, but torture that is not effective is not justified, even if 
the terrorist did possess the vital life saving information. By this reasoning, if a situation was 
to arise, whereby the detainee is without a doubt the terrorist who planted the bomb, if they 
did not break under torture, giving up the bomb’s location and thus allowing it to be defused, 
the torture would not be justified, because the overall result is not the saving of thousands of 
lives. The torture would be unjustified, despite the fact that that it would defy all logic not to 
torture the individual, because it is certain that they are in possession of life saving 
information. In this instance, the effectiveness of torture, and in turn the ability of the terrorist 
to resist it, dictates its justifiability. 
On these bases, justifiability is dictated by chance; the chance that the detainee possesses 
the necessary information, and the chance that they will divulge it when tortured. Any policy 
whose justifications rest in the cast of a dice, represents a deeply flawed legislative process 
that should not be followed by any respectable government.  
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We Kill People in War, Why Not Torture? The Effect on the Victim 
When juxtaposed with the atrocities and collateral damage evidenced in the Iraq war, the 
scale of the abuse of detainees in places such as Abu Ghraib simply does not compare. 
Thus, if society is prepared to accept the indiscriminate deaths, maiming, and suffering 
inevitably caused by bombing as part of war, what is so unacceptable about torture? Why is 
it so different?388 
The answer becomes apparent upon examination of the relationship that exists between 
torturer and victim. The torturer ‘inflicts pain one-on-one, up close and personal, in order to 
break the spirit of the victim… to tyrannise and dominate [them].’389 The act of torture is 
intimate. Luban likens it to that shared between lovers, describing it as a ‘perverse parody of 
friendship and intimacy’390 whereby the focus is aggrandised upon ‘causing pain and 
tyrannising the victim’s spirit’.391 
Falk explains that torture is distinguished from violence in war because of the ‘contrast 
between the helplessness of the victim and the total control of the perpetrator.’392 During 
combat, members of both sides have a chance of winning the fight; neither side is helpless, 
nor in total control. However, ‘[t]orture begins only after the fight is – for the victim - 
finished’.393 Their surrender is followed by new attacks by now unrestrained conquerors, they 
have no chance to defend themselves, they are helpless. ’In this respect torture is indeed 
not analogous to the killing in battle of a healthy and well armed foe; it is a cruel assault 
upon the defenceless.‘394  
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Shue offers the suggestion that, once a soldier has been captured, they can no longer be 
classified as an enemy combatant because they are ‘no longer a threat; they are entirely at 
the torturers mercy.’395 Prima facie this appears to be accurate; the detainee is unarmed and 
helpless. This, however, fails to account for any plans that they have already put into motion; 
a terrorist who has planted a bomb does not suddenly become harmless upon capture 
because the bomb is still ticking away somewhere. In this case, ‘[t]he information withheld 
from the interrogators might be construed as an ongoing threat, often more deadly than, and 
at times as immediate as, that of a fully armed opposing soldier.’396 It could be argued that 
‘there is something beyond the initial surrender which the torturer wants from the victim’;397 
their cooperation. Therefore ‘[t]he victim is not, on this view, utterly helpless… as long as he 
or she holds in reserve an act of compliance which would satisfy the torturer and bring the 
torture to an end.’398  
However, it must be remembered that the torturer faces no personal risk unlike on the 
battlefield; they inflict ‘unspeakable pain while facing no risk of retaliation’.399 This cannot be 
justified by the simple reason that their victim will not cooperate. Further, given the chaotic 
and imprecise nature of conflict, a very real possibility exists that the person under 
interrogation might only possess partial information, or none at all, making it impossible for 
them to cooperate in order to stop the torture. ‘Even [if they] reveal all the information [they] 
have… the interrogator might not be persuaded that they do not hold more useful details. In 
such cases there is nothing they can do to avoid [being tortured]. They are defenceless, and 
are entirely at the interrogator’s mercy.’400  
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When considered thus, it becomes easy to differentiate between the unfocused damage 
produced by the confusion of war and the concise and deliberate nature of that caused by 
torture. As Scarry explains, the world of a man in great pain makes little sense, ‘as in dying 
and death, so in serious pain the claims of the body utterly nullify the claims of the world.’401 
In the victim’s world, one where torture such as waterboarding is quite literally designed to 
replicate the feeling of dying, ‘the human soul finds no home and no repose’,402 there exists 
only pain. 
When faced with the abhorrent reality of torture depicted above, how can anyone with an 
estimable moral compass possibly advocate torture? Imagine being forced into a Palestinian 
chair, your hands and ankles tied together, the chair forcing you to lean forward in a crouch, 
placing all of your weight on your thighs. Now imagine being left there for hours at a time, 
‘The physical pain is excruciating, but the mental and sort of emotional strain of knowing 
that… there’s simply no way to recover’, it was torture.403 Alternatively, picture having your 
hands tied behind your back, then being winched to the ceiling and electrocuted until you 
faint.404 The physical pain caused by certain forms of torture is inconceivable. 
Worse than the physical effects, however, are the psychological ones. Envisage being 
unable to bathe or shower ever again, instead being reduced to washing with a cloth, or 
being incapable of pulling a jumper over your head for fear of bringing back the memories.405 
These are but a few of the long-lasting psychological effects of waterboarding alone. 
Basoglu and others report that the psychological problems most commonly described by 
torture survivors in research studies406 include psychological symptoms such as anxiety, 
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depression, aggression, emotional lability and self-isolation. Cognitive symptoms like 
confusion or disorientation, impaired memory and concentration, and neurovegetative 
symptoms such as insomnia, nightmares and sexual dysfunction.407  
Parry explains that part of the reason torture is so damaging from a psychological 
perspective, lies ‘in its ability to invert and degrade the ideas of… consent, and 
responsibility. Once torture begins, the result is always the product of the victim’s choice. If 
the victim provides information, then she or she is weak, perhaps even a betrayer.’408 ‘If, on 
the other hand, the victim resists, then he or she will be tortured again… According to the 
logic of torture, if the victim talks, the pain will cease; by failing to talk, the victim consents to 
more torture.’409  
The point is; torture presents the illusion that the victim makes a ‘choice’ as to what shall 
transpire; they either provide the requested information, or give their ‘consent’ for the torture 
to continue. As such, they are responsible for the outcome. The idea that the victim could be 
held responsible for such an egregious violation of their mind and body is entirely perverse. 
Yet this is the world torture operates in; it warps the fabric of the victim’s reality, twisting the 
narrative to lay blame on the victim themselves. In such a confusing and pain riddled 
situation, it may not be possible to preserve the idea that they, the victim, are not to blame; 
they are not consenting to be tortured; the torturer is choosing to torture them, and therefore 
they are completely responsible.  
As a further point, Shue claims that the mistake most make when discussing torture, ‘is to 
assume that the only consideration relevant to moral permissibility is the amount of harm 
done.’410 However, ‘even if one grants that killing someone in combat is doing [them a] 
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greater harm than torturing [them],411 it by no means follows that there could not be a 
justification for the greater harm that was not applicable to the lesser harm.’412  
Killing a soldier during war may be justifiable in order to minimise overall harm, for example 
in self defence or the defence of others; but the same may not hold true for torturing that 
same person, because the reality of torture is so abundantly different from killing in war. 
Thus, in this context, killing, a ‘more’ harmful action, is justified and therefore morally 
permissible, whilst torture, a ‘less’ harmful action, is not. 
Overall, the effects on the victim are often so incomprehensibly damaging, both immediately 
and long-term, physically and mentally, that it becomes near impossible to justify the use of 
torture in any circumstance, as psychologist Anthoine-Milhomme describes: ‘I don’t think you 
can be totally healed. You’re just different.’413  
 
The Effect on the Torturer 
It is also worth considering the impact of torture on the torturer. Gerrity reports that the 
‘resulting psychological symptoms are very similar to those of victims, including anxiety, 
intrusive traumatic memories, and impaired cognitive and social functioning.’414 These 
symptoms are incredibly detrimental to the torturer and further represent the negative impact 
torture can have. 
Because torture often involves violence, studies focusing on the perpetrators of violent 
crimes have additional relevance for understanding the impact of torture on the torturers 
themselves.415 Evans and others examined the development of intrusive memories of their 
actions in perpetrators of violent crime. They found that 46% of respondents reported 
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distressing intrusive memories.416 This is a worryingly high percentage. If extrapolated to the 
context of Iraq and Afghan wars; it is conceivable that there are not only tens-of-thousands 
of psychologically damaged victims, but also thousands of mentally unstable interrogators. 
The unstable psyche and impaired cognitive functioning often associated with exposure to 
violence is perhaps apparent in the case of Rafael Perez, a CRASH417 Unit policeman in Los 
Angeles Police Department’s Rampart Division convicted of shooting and then framing an 
unarmed gang member. Perez proffered a variation of Friedrich Nietzsche’s thought-
provoking quote whilst making his statement to court. He advised that ‘[w]hoever chases 
monsters should see to it that in the process he does not become a monster himself.’418 
Here, Perez essentially concedes that in attempting to do the right thing by pursuing a 
‘monster’, he violated the laws that he had promised to uphold, becoming the monster 
himself. 
It is possible to draw parallels between Perez’s situation and the torture practiced during the 
Iraq and Afghan wars. It is arguable that the majority of the torture carried out, especially on 
high value detainees, was carried out with ‘good intentions’; with the aim of capturing or 
killing the ‘monsters’ responsible for running Al-Qaeda. However, there may come a point 
whereby the exposure to violence experienced by interrogators, amplified by the intimate 
nature of torture, could turn a ‘well meaning’ torturer into the very monster that they are 
chasing, and in doing so, corrupt the purpose for which the torture was first embarked on. 
Having considered the effects on both parties concerned in torture, it becomes apparent 
that, as Mokjtar observes, the practice ‘is an atrocious violation of human dignity because it 
inflicts individual suffering and dehumanizes both the victim and the perpetrator.’419  
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Terrorists: The Political Cost and the Risk to Allied Troops 
‘Given the compelling need to protect the nation’s security, governments experience 
considerable pressure to place the interrogation of suspected terrorists in “the 
twilight shadows of the law”420 — especially given terrorists’ propensities, much 
demonstrated, to exploit the laws and sensitivities of others but to observe few limits 
on their own behaviour.’421  
The temptation to do so, however, must be avoided at all costs because of the extensive 
negative effects associated with the use of torture. ‘Torture costs American lives... I learned 
in Iraq that the No. 1 reason foreign fighters flocked there to fight were the abuses carried 
out at Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo. Our policy of torture was directly and swiftly recruiting 
fighters for Al-Qaeda’.422 Here, Matthew Alexander, leader of an interrogations team in Iraq, 
supplies perhaps the most convincing argument against the use of torture; its political cost. 
As the Roman jurist Ulpian once said, torture is a ‘risky business’.423 The US’ own Army 
Field Manual states as much: ‘Revelation of use of torture by US personnel will bring 
discredit upon the US and its armed forces while undermining domestic and international 
support for the war effort.’424 Mackey, an army interrogator who served in Afghanistan, 
experienced this first hand. He believes that Abu Ghraib’s ‘images of depravity will inflame 
anti-American sentiment in the Muslim world for a generation, driving who knows how many 
would-be jihadists into the ranks of Al-Qaeda’.425 By advocating torture, the US undermined 
its political and public standing, its only justification being the extraction of useful information. 
Levinson explains that ‘[t]here is a special reason for the United States, among all countries, 
to choose adherence to the no-torture “taboo”.’426 He suggests that ‘[o]ne might well believe 
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in a “contagion affect.” If the US is widely believed to accept torture as a proper means of 
fighting the war against terrorism, then why should any other country refrain?’427 For 
example, ‘when a recent [US] State Department annual report on human rights criticized 
China… for human rights violations, China peremptorily dismissed the criticisms, taking the 
United States to task for using a “double standard” in judging other countries’ behaviour.’428  
The US cannot effectively criticise, or hold to account, other countries for violating 
international treaties whilst violating them themselves, doing so holds neither weight nor 
conviction and represents a highly hypocritical way of thinking. Dennis Blair, former Director 
of US National Intelligence, summarises that ‘[t]he bottom line is these techniques have hurt 
our image around the world, the damage they have done to our interest far outweighed 
whatever benefit they gave us’,429 and consequently concludes that enhanced interrogational 
techniques ‘are not essential to our national security’.430 
Rumney asserts, that ‘[t]he targeting of the innocent by the state… may lead to anger and a 
greater willingness to support or engage in terrorist activity.’431 Further, ‘[i]t may also lead to 
a sense of alienation and destruction of mutual respect that destroys the trust necessary for 
people to disclose meaningful intelligence to state authorities.’432 Therefore, intelligence 
gained through the use of coercive techniques must ‘be considered in light of a wider body of 
evidence suggesting that negative effects may, to some degree, undercut apparent gains.’433  
However, Yoo has argued that the claim that using coercion will 'prove to be an added 
incentive for the enemy to fight all the harder' is a 'highly speculative and empirically 
unsupported assumption'.’434  
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Rumney suggests using the context of Guantánamo Bay as a way of ‘testing the claim that 
the use of torture and other forms of harsh treatment during interrogation led to terrorist 
mobilisation.’435 He explains that ‘[i]f the claim has validity, one would expect a significant 
number of former detainees who have been the subject of coercion either to engage in acts 
of terrorism and insurgency… on their release.’436 However, statistics released by the US 
Defense Intelligence Agency in January 2013437 suggested that only twenty-seven percent of 
six-hundred former Guantánamo detainees have been confirmed (97), or suspected (72) of 
having 'reengaged' in terrorist or insurgent activity.438 Considering that, as a conservative 
estimate, at least some the Guantánamo detainees were involved in terrorist activity prior to 
their detainment, and were therefore likely to reengage upon release, regardless of 
treatment, 27 percent is not a high enough percentage to suggest a correlation. Runmey 
concludes that ‘[t]hese statistics do not provide reliable evidence of detention or harsh 
interrogation at Guantánamo having the effect of mobilising active involvement in terrorism 
or insurgency.’439  
Statistics such as these are problematic because ‘they do not provide an explanation as to 
why some detainees engage in terrorism or insurgency following release’;440 they only supply 
the raw data. Even if the percentage of ‘reengaging’ detainees were higher, enough to 
suggest a correlation for example, because we do not know the exact motivations for their 
actions, causation cannot be claimed. Therefore, reengagement in terrorist activity cannot be 
attributed to detainment at Guantánamo without the provision of further evidence. 
It must be noted, however, that these statistics do not prove that the opposite is true; it is still 
possible that coercive interrogation may result in engagement with terrorist activity. Yet 
demonstrating that this is the case is problematic, because the only way to prove so would 
involve interviewing those who have engaged in terrorist activity, having first been tortured, 
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in order to discern their motivations. Such a task is practically impossible as no terrorist 
would agree to be interviewed. As a matter of logic, if an individual already held extremist 
views, but had not yet taken the step of engaging in acts of terrorism, and then they, or a 
family member were tortured, it is foreseeable that such an event could act as a catalyst; 
ultimately creating a terrorist of them. 
In the absence of empirical proof, anecdotal evidence serves as a useful tool for 
demonstrating the effects of coercive interrogation. McKearney, a former member of the IRA, 
argues that while the use of illegal interrogation methods may have short-term benefits: ‘in 
the long term it is destructive to the aims of those who are using it, because it thoroughly 
alienates those against whom it is perpetrated… their communities feel the pain as well… It 
drives people to greater excesses than they might have originally contemplated.’441  Imagine 
being tortured, how is someone, especially if they are innocent, expected to feel after being 
violated in such a way? Angry certainly, mistrusting of authority, definitely, even vengeful; 
these are normal reactions to such an ordeal. It is only logical that those communities 
against whom torture is perpetrated feel disaffected. The process destroys any chance of 
cooperation from the community, as well as increasing willingness to engage with terrorism. 
Waldron criticises the use of torture from a different perspective, he states that ‘[t]orture of 
prisoners threatens to undermine the integrity of the surrender/incarceration regime: if we 
can torture prisoners, then we can do anything to them, and if we can do anything to them, 
then the willingness of defeated soldiers to surrender will be quite limited.’442 This has an 
unfavourable knock-on effect; for example, ‘[a] lack of humane treatment may induce an 
enemy to fight to the death rather than surrender, thereby leading to increased friendly 
casualties.’443 Whereas, if enemies recognise that surrender and incarceration is better than 
death in combat because they are aware that they will be humanely treated, they may be 
more likely to surrender. 
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However, the point must be made that ‘[c]oncern about reciprocity is based on the empirical 
assumption that terrorists will observe fewer rules if we observe fewer rules.’444 Yet this 
‘assumption may not be true. In a world where terrorist adversaries behead captives, it is at 
least arguable that terrorists assume they will receive harsh treatment no matter what we 
do.’445 This argument, however, appears to be somewhat defeatist; it criticises a theory on 
the basis that it is derived from assumption, and so may not be accurate, but offers only a 
counter theory, based upon similar assumptions, to disprove the initial hypothesis. There 
exists a lack of empirical evidence for both claims, the difference is; the former provides a 
potential solution, which if effective will save lives, whereas the later offers only a fatalistic 
outlook on the issue, making the former inherently more valuable. 
Speaking in 2009 on America’s use of enhanced interrogation techniques, President Obama 
summarised that EITs: 
Serve as a recruitment tool for terrorists, and increase the will of our enemies to fight 
us, while decreasing the will of others to work with America. They risk the lives of 
our troops by making it less likely that others will surrender to them in battle, and 
more likely that Americans will be mistreated if they are captured. In short, they did 
not advance our war and counterterrorism efforts -- they undermined them.446 
Based on the weighing of these factors, there exists a contradiction between stopping a 
terror plot, versus stopping terrorism; the government may prevent a single attack through 
torture, but in doing so it may generate support for the terrorists’ cause. ‘In effect, the use of 
torture to stop terrorism has, paradoxically, created more terrorists.’447 Thus, measured in 
these terms, torture is inherently ineffective and should not be utilised. 
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Torture Warrants:  A ‘Case’ for Torture? 
Ackerman states that ‘[s]ecurity services can panic in the face of horrific tragedy. With 
officials in disarray, with rumours of impending attacks circulating, and with an outraged 
public demanding instant results, there will be overwhelming temptations to use indecent 
forms of interrogation.’448 In acknowledgment of this point, some torture advocates suggest 
employing a ‘torture warrants’ system. Applying such a system would provide a framework 
within which officials could work, potentially preventing any extralegal forms of interrogation 
from occurring in times of crisis. 
Under torture warrants, coercive interrogational practices would become acceptable, when, 
and only when, performed under close supervision from the judiciary; before coercive 
interrogation could take place, permission from a judge would have to be obtained. From a 
humanitarian perspective, this would clearly be beneficial; it would potentially ‘reduce the 
use of torture to the smallest amount and degree possible, while creating public 
accountability for its rare use.’449 Proponents suggest that this would go a long way to 
‘justifying’ the use of torture. 
Rumney, however, is of the opinion that ‘while the use of a law-based regulatory 
arrangement might give the impression of precision and control, the reality of interrogational 
torture and emergency powers generally suggests that regulation would lead to significant 
regulatory difficulties.’450 Before such an arrangement could come into force, when and to 
what degree the power could be used must be precisely defined, and who can use the 
power must also be determined. What is the level of threat necessary before torture is 
permitted? How many lives must be at risk?451 Must the threat be immediate? At what point 
is the line drawn beyond which any torture must stop? These are issues that cannot be 
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easily dealt with due to their sensitive and complex nature, yet they must be resolved in an 
exceptionally precise manner before any system could be put in place. Beyond these initial 
legislative difficulties, ensuring use of the power does not spread beyond its limited scope, 
especially in circumstances of urgency, may prove to be impossible. 
The torture warrants proposal ‘asks us to assume that the power to authorise torture will not 
be abused, that intelligence officials will not lie about what is at stake or about the availability 
of information’452 in order to use torture in situations where it is not necessary or legally 
justified. But the fact of the matter is, ‘[t]here will always be individuals who act in a way that 
is simply abusive relative to whatever authorisation is given them.’453 For example, ‘[s]ome 
officials will tend to view their legally permitted scope of action as the starting point from 
which to push the envelope in pursuit of their appointed task… The wider the scope of 
legally permitted action, the wider the resulting expansion of extralegal physical pressure.’454 
By allowing a small amount of torture in specific circumstances, we not only expand the 
parameters of what is legally possible, but also the limits to which lawbreakers are willing to 
push beyond that which is permitted.455  
Setting up a framework for judicially approved torture is one thing, ensuring people adhere to 
it is another entirely. Waldron states that we are not asking whether motives like retribution, 
sadism, sexual sadism, the pleasure of indulging brutality [and] the love of power… 
can be judicially regulated in the abstract. We are asking whether they can be 
regulated in the kind of circumstances of fear, anger, stress, danger, panic, and 
terror in which, realistically, the hypothetical case must be poised.456  
A soldier who has just lost several comrades, or a police chief serving in the wake of a 9/11 
type event, may not be capable of maintaining strict accordance with a torture warrants 
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system. The above mentioned factors may, understandably so, cloud their judgement; 
influencing them to forgo the judicial checks and balances designed to prevent the very 
actions they are at risk of performing. 
Dratel offers a further criticism; he explains that in situations such as the ticking-bomb 
scenario the warrant may arrive too late to be of use: ‘By the time judicial imprimatur were 
obtained, any ticking time-bomb would have already exploded – rendering the process 
entirely ineffective in addressing an emergency.’457 This principle applies to any time-limited 
situation, which in war, occur on a daily basis; decisions are continuously made based on 
the information available at that point in time, meaning any delay in obtaining said 
information may cost lives. Certainly, the implementation of torture warrants could reduce 
the amount of extraneous torture, but this would come in exchange for a delay in obtaining 
vital information, somewhat contradicting the frequently claimed urgency of torture and 
potentially rendering the process pointless. 
Some of those who argue against the use of torture warrants, or any legalisation of torture 
for that matter, still support the use of torture if it could save multiple lives.458 Yet, by 
providing no legal framework for such situations, they ‘leave the initial decision to the ex ante 
decision of the torturers and then leave the post facto decision about whether the torturer did 
the right thing to a jury of peers.’459  
Such thinking hints at a certain level of naivety, or at least a degree of blind confidence in the 
legal system. For no prosecutor would prosecute, nor ‘jury convict, if it turned out that the 
torturer was right, even if the basis on which he acted was weak or bigoted. But some juries 
might well convict if the torturer turned out to be wrong, even if he or she had a very strong 
basis on which to act.’460 Without a clear system, unjustified torture that happened to save 
lives would go unpunished, yet justified but unsuccessful torture may result in penalisation. 
                                            
457
 Joshua Dratel, 'The Curious Debate' in Karen J. Greenberg (ed), The Torture Debate in America 
(Cambridge University Press 2006) 112. 
458
 See Richard A Posner, ‘Torture, Terrorism and Interrogation’ in Stanford Levinson (ed), Torture: A 
Collection (Oxford University Press, 2004). 
459
 Alan Dershowitz, ‘Tortured Reasoning’ in Stanford Levinson (ed), Torture: A Collection (Oxford 
University Press 2004) 274 
460
 ibid. 
Chapter Seven: The Torture Debate - The Case Against 
87 
 
Thus, the standards upon which a legal system is based are held in disregard; the only point 
considered is the end result. 
Dershowitz makes a further point, suggesting that the person who makes the final decision 
on whether to torture or not should be ‘the highest ranking public official capable of doing so 
– someone with accountability and responsibility… ‘We don’t want individual savours to be 
taking ad-hoc, secret, unaccountable, decisions whether to inflict torture.’461 Without a 
regulatory system for torture, it is entirely possible that individuals in certain circumstances 
may be forced to make a decision on whether to employ torture whilst lacking the experience 
or qualification to do so. In addition, it is far harder to hold people accountable for their 
actions without knowledge how, why and concerning who they are made. 
As a justification for torture, albeit the limited use of it, torture warrants are criticised by both 
opponents and proponents of torture, indeed they founder for many reasons. Firstly, there is 
no guarantee that the power would not spread beyond its initial function, being abused and 
having its boundaries expanded in dire situations. Secondly, they place allied lives at risk by 
creating a potentially lethal delay in attaining information. Lastly, they fail to protect everyone 
from torture, still allowing those deemed ‘worthy’ of torture to be subjected to it. This criticism 
contains within it a political dimension. Because ‘once legitimated, torture [can] develop a 
constituency with a vested interest in perpetuating it’,462 there is a possibility that the torture 
warrants power could be used by one part of society to label another as terrorists in order to 
abuse or oppress them. Such an abuse of power would serve to corrupt the system’s 
purpose; twisting its intentions from good to malevolent. It is tempting to support extreme 
measures such as these whilst far removed from the members of society that they will affect. 
In order to ensure they are just, measures such as these must be considered from the point 
of view of those likely to be exposed to the negatives they bring; in the current climate, this is 
Muslims. Muslims are far more likely to fall victim to terrorism related law enforcement, than 
for example a white middle-aged man, due to the ethnic background to which previous 
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terrorists have belonged. It is therefore important to acknowledge, and examine from 
different perspectives, the potentially disastrous effects on certain sections of society that the 
introduction of torture warrants could have.463  
It cannot, however, go without mention, that by neglecting to put in place some form of 
regulation, states risk torture being ordered and carried out under the radar and without 
accountability. Be that as it may, when considered as a whole, it is arguable that torture 
warrants represent an unsatisfactory middle ground, and set a dangerous precedent, as ‘any 
effort to regulate torture ends up legitimising it and inviting its repetition’464 as will become 
apparent in the ‘Torture: What Comes Next’ and ‘The Absolute Prohibition as an Archetype – 
A Road to Slippery Slopes’ sections below. 
 
Security and Liberty: Intra-Personal Trade-Offs vs Inter-Personal Trade-Offs 
When discussing legislation related to terrorism, proponents often cite the relationship 
between security and liberty. They suggest that by sacrificing a small degree of liberty, each 
member of society will be rewarded with an increased amount of security.465 Prima facie, 
such a trade-off appears to be not only reasonable, but beneficial. This, however, is not 
always the case; whilst in this context, both types of trade-off, intra-personal and inter-
personal, involve the gain or loss of security and liberty, there exists a glaring distinction 
between them. 
The simplest example of an intra-personal trade-off is the burden of a legal requirement to 
wear a seatbelt. The public restrict their freedom to sit in their cars as they like, because they 
are convinced that it will make everyone safer and less liable to injury or death. They are all 
happy to do this because they collectively gain safety at the cost of losing a small amount of 
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freedom. This trade-off is categorised as intra-personal because it is mutually beneficial: 
each member of society bears the cost and each member reaps the benefits.466 
In contrast, inter-personal trade-offs sacrifice the liberty of the few, in order for the majority to 
be, or at least feel, more safe. For example, members of a minority are detained without 
trial,467 have restrictive obligations imposed upon them,468 or are beaten during 
interrogation,469 in order to allegedly make the majority more secure.  
The difference is, the person who gains the security is not the person who loses their liberty, 
meaning there is no collective ‘security gain - liberty cost’ balance. Rather, those individuals 
or groups who are labelled as threats shoulder the cost, often having their rights restricted, 
whilst the rest of society reap the supposed benefits.470  
President Trump’s recent ‘Muslim ban’ exemplifies this principle; Mr Trump’s Executive 
Order 13769: Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States,471 
‘bar[ed] citizens of seven Muslim-majority countries from entering the US for a period of 90 
days’472 in the hope that the new ‘extreme vetting system w[ould] help keep radical Islamic 
terrorists out of the US.’473 In essence, Muslims had their movement, and thus liberty, 
restricted, in order to provide security for the majority of America’s citizens.  
It is possible to apply the precedent this example provides to the legalisation of torture. If 
torture were to be legalised, individuals belonging to the minorities associated with terrorism 
would bear the cost, whilst the majority of America’s citizens enjoyed the security the laws 
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offered. This not only constitutes an inter-personal trade-off, but also represents an 
imbalance; without having to sacrifice any liberty, most US citizens stand to gain a degree of 
perceived security, whilst members of the Islamic community live at risk of being detained 
and tortured, thus suffering a potentially deadly reduction in liberty.474  
Christian teaching offers a further criticism of inter-personal trade-offs. Waldron explains that 
most justifications of torture rest ‘upon an apprehension that certain goods can be attained 
by problematic means and that whatever else we might say about a particular means being 
prohibited, we cannot deny the value of what its violation might secure.’475 For example, if 
through the use of torture, safety can be secured, then the use of this means might be 
objectionable, but the value of the safety cannot be denied.  
However, Christianity teaches that ‘certain goods might be objectively tainted on account of 
the methods that were used to achieve them.’476 The Bible poses the question ‘[f]or what 
shall it profit a man, if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?’477 The answer, 
to a Christian at least, is not at all. The safety provided via the use of inter-personal trade-
offs is objectively tainted due to the cost it is purchased at. Thus, when applied to torture, it 
becomes apparent that the beneficial aspects that security and safety provide are ‘ultimately 
not worth having – if the price of our security is torture.’478   
Considered as a whole, policies such as these are inherently unfair and incredibly 
dangerous. By passing pro-torture legislation such as torture warrants, states disregard the 
burden of protection that they owe to all citizens, regardless of their status as suspected 
terrorists.479 Further, states risk disenfranchising the minority communities who would fall 
victim to them, this in turn may result in increased support for terrorist groups and even  
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radicalisation of the nation’s citizens, ultimately leading to a greater threat than was originally 
faced, thus defeating the initial purpose of the legislation.480 
Considering the adverse effects associated with repressive counter-terrorism measures 
discussed above, the question must be asked; why do states still choose to employ them? 
Rumney suggests that: 
the notion of imminent threat can subdue political opposition to such measures 
because legislators do not want to be seen to be failing to protect the innocent from 
terrorist violence. In such circumstances, security is often seen as an interest more 
important to protect than liberty.481  
Are measures such as these not appropriate though; they clearly have their drawbacks, but 
when all things are considered, is security not intrinsically more important than liberty. 
Although abominable as a practice, people can be compensated for, and recover from 
torture, this of course does not hold true for those who die from a terrorist attack. No one 
wants to be responsible for a potentially unavoidable 9/11 type event, legislators’ fears are 
well founded in this regard. 
The question essentially being asked here, is whether ‘there are times where the rights-
based model of democracy [should be] supplanted by… a siege mode of democracy.’482 In 
times of crisis, can states value collective security over individual rights and should they? 
Cole opines that ‘the question of what is legal and the question of what is the right thing to 
do as a policy matter are not identical.’483 Just because something can be done legally, does 
not mean it should be done. In terms of policy making, pursuing repressive measures may, 
despite being possible and even appealing, be the wrong course of action. 
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The fact of the matter is ‘harsh’ ‘counter-terrorism strategies do not necessarily improve 
security’.484 For example, ‘[i]t has been argued that counterterrorism policies and their 
implementation can promote a sense of victimisation within particular communities through 
the creation of what have been termed 'suspect communities'.’485 Here, whole communities 
are treated as suspects and targeted by policing techniques.486 Rumney argues that hard 
repression such as this, ‘may undermine the effectiveness of counterterrorism measures by 
hardening attitudes, encouraging people to join terrorist groups and leading to acts of 
terrorism.’487 This is not to say that the use of repression cannot ‘achieve increased security, 
but [that it] can actually make things worse by creating a backlash and enabling terrorist 
groups to exploit abuses and mistakes by the state.’488  
The introduction of legalised torture may well have a similar effect; Muslims may be treated 
as suspect communities, more so than they arguably already are, leading to them being 
unduly subjected to the measure. This in turn, ‘may provoke the kind of 'moral outrage' and 
personalisation of events which… may be a pathway into terrorism.’489 Further, ‘[t]he use of 
torture may also serve to undermine faith in the democratic state which jihadists and 
Islamists already seek to portray as anti-Muslim.’ 490  
In times of crisis, legislators often feel pressured to act in order to maintain security. In such 
circumstances, harsh counter-terrorism measures may become superficially attractive 
because they give the appearance of strength and control, this can result in states wrongly 
adopting siege modes of democracy. Instead, states should preserve rights based models of 
democracy, not only because the rights themselves are of vital importance, but because the 
negative impacts oppressive measures have. 
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Torture:  What Comes Next? 
Social psychology provides the theory that ‘We judge right and wrong against the baseline of 
whatever we have come to consider “normal” behaviour, and if the norm shifts in the 
direction of violence, we will come to tolerate and accept violence as a normal response’.491  
In accepting torture and allowing its practice, there is a danger that a ‘torture culture’ could 
be created in which its use is considered the norm. Abu Ghraib, for example, illustrates a 
fully predictable image of what a torture culture would look like. The flagrant and systematic 
abuse of detainees carried out by agencies such as the CIA within the prison ‘led to a loss of 
accountability’,492 which ultimately bred the ‘anything-goes green light’493 mentality displayed 
by the forces stationed there. 
In such a culture, ‘you cannot reasonably expect that interrogators… will be the fastidious 
and well-meaning torturers’494 imagined in the torture memos or ticking-bomb theory; they 
will not always act in ‘good faith’. Instead, there is a risk of creating a system which cultivates 
the idea that there are no rules, no limits, one in which detainees are tortured simply 
because they can be. This ‘liberal ideology of torture, which assumes that torture can be 
neatly confined to exceptional ticking time-bomb cases and surgically severed from cruelty 
and tyranny, represents a dangerous delusion.’495  
A worrying question emerges: If such a culture were allowed to exist; where does it stop? 
For example, can security services legally kill a prisoner? In ‘A Deadly Interrogation’, Mayer 
describes this exact event. Manadel al-Jamadi, a detainee at Abu Ghraib, died from 
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asphyxiation whilst ‘shackled in a crucifixion-like pose’,496 his head covered with a plastic 
bag. Despite Jamadi’s death being classified as a homicide, a death that resulted from 
unnatural causes, Swanner, Jamadi’s interrogator, has not been charged and continues to 
work for the CIA. Further, no-one has been convicted in relation to the death.497 
The question must therefore be asked; would people feel safe living in a society that permits 
our security forces to detain and torture suspects to death without consequence? ‘We risk 
establishing a precedent that would inevitably be extended beyond its limited utilitarian case 
justification’.498 For the 
incorporation of any form of torture in a penological system… inevitably leads to its 
acceptance as a justifiable procedure by society generally, and involves a danger of 
its extension under suitable conditions. Just as familiarity with torture leads to 
approval of torture, so does the acceptance or ratification of torture lead to its 
justification.499 
The Israeli Landau Commission of 1987, provides a perfect example of how this might 
happen. It authorised the use of ‘moderate physical pressure’ in exceptional situations, 
which, unsurprisingly, gradually became standard procedure, with 80-90% of Palestinian 
security detainees being tortured.500  
Ex US army interrogator, Tony Lagouranis’ first-hand account of his time at Abu Ghraib 
provides a modernised example of ‘torture’s metastatic tendency’.501 Lagouranis confesses 
to using enhanced interrogational techniques, he admits that ‘[o]nce I got started, it seemed 
pointless to stop, and each escalation appeared seamless, natural, and justified.’502 He 
continues, explaining that torture used on one category of prisoners soon spread to all 
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prisoners and that the purpose behind the interrogations changed, ‘[w]e moved from seeking 
intelligence, our original justification, to seeking confessions’.503  
The current context is no different. It would not be long before the limited use of torture 
reported during the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan spread beyond the confinements of 
incarceration to broader application on US soil. In fact, there is some evidence of this 
already; in Chicago between 1970 and 1990, 90 criminal suspects complained of physical 
abuse at the hands of a ‘police torture ring’ that forced confessions. ‘The abuse tactics 
described by the suspects included plastic bags placed over the head for the purpose of 
suffocation, electric shocks to the face and genitals, severe beatings, burning with… and 
putting the barrel of a gun in the mouth or against the head.’504 It is therefore not 
inconceivable that the use of interrogational torture could extend beyond its current 
parameters to use on suspects across the US. In the enduring words of Montesquieu; ‘An 
injustice committed against anyone is a threat to everyone.’505 The acceptance of torture not 
only affects its victims, but also threatens the general population’s civil liberties. 
As such, before pursuing pro-torture polices, states should consider the adverse effects they 
may have. ‘Stated most starkly, the damaging social consequences of a program of torture 
interrogation evolve from institutional dynamics that are independent of the original moral 
rationale.’506 That is to say, while the intentions behind the implementation of a programme 
may be virtuous, draconian-esque policies may well lead to slippery slopes and unintended 
consequences. O’Donohue et al summarise that employing torture only serves to undermine 
trust in key social institutions; the ‘misuse of medical professionals,507 misapplication of 
scientific knowledge… and compromised integrity of the legal system508 lead[s] to a view of 
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these institutions as corrupt and corruptible.’509 This ultimately causes irreparable damage 
within societies that condone torture.510 
 
The Absolute Prohibition as an Archetype - A Road to Slippery Slopes 
The absolute prohibition on torture represents far more than a preventative measure; it 
underpins countless other laws, making it an archetype. ‘Thus, by undermining the 
archetype of the prohibition of torture one also undermines the prohibition of lesser forms of 
brutality. The whole set of injunctions against brutality would unravel and the character of the 
legal system would be corrupted.’511 
Waldron poses the question, ‘[w]hy does the prospect of authorising torture… shock the 
conscience of a scrupulous lawyer?’512 He suggests that the answer lies in the ‘specific 
effect on law’ it would have; the ‘systematic corrupting effect of [torture] becoming one of the 
normal items on the menu of practical consideration’.513 In order to demonstrate his concerns 
regarding this, Waldron offers an analogy: 
Suppose an individual, previously honest, is offered a bribe. Friends warn him 
against the first act of dishonesty, not just for itself, but because of what it is likely to 
do to his character. Part of that is concern about the effect on future decisions of this 
man via the change in his character that this decision has led to. But corruption is 
more than just an enhanced probability of future dishonest acts. It involves a present 
inherent loss: now the man no longer has the sort of character that is set against 
dishonesty; he is no longer has the standing to condemn and oppose dishonesty 
that an honest man would have.514 
This analogy can be applied to the prohibition on torture; not only does a state’s choice to 
employ torture effect its future decisions, making the state more likely to utilise the practise 
again, but worse, now the state cannot condemn with conviction or effectiveness the actions 
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of other states that choose to torture, it can no longer assert those principles515 which were 
previously important to it.516 By permitting torture, or defining what most would regard as 
‘torture’ as ‘not really torture’, states abandon their commitments to the prohibition on torture, 
they move from a situation in which their law had a certain character, a general virtue of non-
brutality, to a situation in which that character would be compromised or corrupted by the 
permitting of this most brutal of practices.517 
However, Dershowitz explains that we have no such commitment to an unwavering 
prohibition on torture. Stating that ‘our commitment instead is to the way of the hypocrites: 
[our governments] declare that they abide by the rule of law, but turn a blind eye to what 
goes on beneath the surface.’518 While this statement may be true - there is certainly plenty 
of evidence of America employing torture whilst claiming to abide by its prohibition - it misses 
the point; the issue at discussion here is that of legalising torture, and doing so is very 
different from using it covertly. 
Lode warns that legalising torture may lead to a corrupting of the decision-making process; 
‘by allowing each successive case on a slope, judges' views on the law may begin to change 
in ways that lead them to neglect their possible hesitancy to step on the slope in the first 
place,’519 even going through the process of considering a legal basis for torture may alter 
our views of the practice.520 Therefore, arguments such as the ticking-bomb hypothetical can 
be dangerous; they expose the possibility of justifiable torture, and in doing so ‘decrease 
torture’s deplorability in the minds of others, lending it a veil of legitimacy.’521 
As such, Wisnewski labels the Ticking Bomb theoretical, ‘a wedge argument. It is the first 
step in defending a more general policy allowing torture in some instances, even if these 
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instances are strictly supervised and quite exceptional.’522 He suggests that it is easy for 
many to respond to such arguments with a slippery slope objection.523 Slippery slope 
arguments caution that ‘if you perform act A1, justifying it by its desirable result R1, you will 
also, inevitably, bring about undesirable results R2, R3, R4 etc’.524 Lode submits that ‘[s]uch 
arguments generally hold that we should resist a particular… policy, either on the grounds 
that allowing it could lead us to allow another practice or policy that is clearly objectionable, 
or on the grounds that we can draw no rationally defensible line between the two.’525 In the 
current context, in order to avoid torture and other similar practices becoming pervasive, we 
must adopt a strict no tolerance policy for them.526  
However, Bagaric and Clarke contend that this line of argument is somewhat fallacious. 
They point out that ‘laws that permit citizens to use self-help measures to inflict… harm such 
as self-defense… have not resulted in significant abuses. This is despite the fact that such 
laws are ‘gray’ in application and the lawfulness of the conduct is generally evaluated after 
that fact’.527 On this basis, it is arguable that ‘[p]ermitting torture in extreme cases [would] not 
amount to permitting it in all cases.’528 It is ‘insufficient to simply point out that a current 
policy might lead to one that is substantially worse.’529 Wisnewski asserts that ‘[t]his ‘might’, 
merely expresses a worry; it does not constitute an argument… slippery slope arguments 
are objections only when they are based on evidence (like historical precedent). They cannot 
simply be invented.’530  
Lode suggests that slippery slopes are dangerous because they ‘often take the form of a 
continuum: Each case on the slope will tend to differ from its successive case only 
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incrementally.'531 This is particularly problematic because the notion of precedent plays a 
large role in most legal systems. ‘If a court is confronted with a succession of cases, each of 
which differs from the previous case only incrementally, the court may take its decision to 
allow L as a precedent for allowing M; it may then take its decision to allow M as a precedent 
for allowing N’,532 and so on until you reach Z. 
Machiavelli famously stated: ‘Everyone sees what is happening but not everyone feels its 
consequences.’533 This assertion can be applied to the context of slippery slopes. It is 
possible to see that judgment M has been reached because of precedent L, however, what 
is not clear, are the lasting consequences of this decision. It is perhaps predictable that 
judgment N is made as a result of precedent M, but the idea that this may eventually lead to 
ruling Z, is often beyond consideration. In this manner, slippery slopes go undetected; courts 
approve the use of torture in increasingly less appropriate circumstances, based upon the 
judgements made in previous cases because they are not aware of the lasting effects their 
decisions may have. 
In spite of this, it is possible to argue that ‘[e]ven if legalising torture puts us on a slippery 
slope, could we not stop the slide downwards? Dershowitz proposes a ‘principled break’:534 
suggesting that a strict set of rules regulating the use of torture could prevent any slide 
occurring. For example, ‘if nonlethal torture were legally limited to convicted terrorists who 
had knowledge of future massive terrorist acts, were given immunity, and still refused to 
provide the information’,535 then not only would any torture be justified, but confining the use 
of torture would be possible as a clear line had been drawn. The point is, there are morally 
relevant differences between employing torture in the circumstances Dershowitz suggests 
and using it in other cases, these can be appealed to in order to distinguish between the two. 
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Therefore, we are not logically committed to accepting torture in every case merely because 
it was approved in one set of circumstances.536 
However, Dershowitz’s talk of ‘principled breaks’ does nothing to address the ‘symbolic 
setback in the world-wide campaign against human rights abuses’537 that legitimising torture 
would result in. Such an undermining of the absolute prohibition on torture ‘cannot be 
compensated, probably not even mitigated, by recourse to alleged “principled breaks”.’538 As 
such, the risks associated with legalising any degree of torture, both immediate and future, 
far outweigh the limited potential for positive results. 
 
Torture and the Medical Community 
Arrigo submits that ‘Government-sponsored torture generates deep conflicts within medical 
communities and between governments and their medical communities’539 because it 
routinely involves the participation of medical personnel. ‘Medical professionals determine 
the types of torture a person can endure, monitor the person for endurance under torture, 
resuscitate the person, treat the person to prepare for further torture, and administer non-
therapeutic drugs.’540 Further, ‘[t]o cover up torture physicians [even] falsify health 
certificates, autopsy reports, and death certificates.’541 This creates tension within medical 
communities, as many of those working in the profession view any participation in torture as 
antithetical to the ideals that they are supposed to uphold and represent. For example, in 
response to Turkish physicians establishing torture treatment centres, Turkish ‘authorities 
demanded their patient lists and brought [them] to trial, accusing them of criticizing the 
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government.’542 Shockingly, ‘Turkish physicians have also been harassed, arrested, and 
even tortured’.543 
It has, however, been argued by some that ‘[i]f torture becomes inevitable it is necessary to 
humanise it and have an attending physician to moderate it, and even stop it if, in his 
medical opinion, it becomes physically dangerous’.544 In order for this to be possible, the 
involvement of medical personnel is undoubtedly crucial, as without it, the practise risks 
irreversibly damaging those subjected to it. 
This line of argument is, however, somewhat self-defeating; torture damages its victims 
regardless of the presence or absence of medical professionals to oversee it, its very nature 
causes physical or psychological harm, and it is for this reason that disagreements and 
hostilities have arisen. 
The CIA’s post 9/11 torture programme provides a modern illustration of the conflict caused 
by the involvement of medical staff in enhanced interrogation. ‘[H]uman-rights-minded 
physicians say [Office of Medical Staff]545 violated a fundamental obligation of medical ethics 
– to do no harm – and instead provided agency torturers with a physiologically informed 
blueprint for inflicting pain.’546 They criticise the OMS for providing ‘precise specifications for 
enforcing sleep deprivation, limiting the caloric intake of detainees’ food, and the proper 
positions for waterboarding, as outlined in a 2004 document providing ‘guidelines on medical 
and psychological support’ for torture.’547 
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By resisting the use of torture, the medical community demonstrates that professionals 
within their field will not blindly follow government policies that are contrary to their principles 
simply because the state declares it necessary. Vincent Lacopino, medical director of 
Physicians for Human Rights, states ‘[t]he guidelines are an affront to my profession, the 
medical and mental-health professions, and health professionals should know better and be 
ashamed of defending a document like this’.548  
Lacopino’s vehement condemnation of the OMS’ guidelines indicate that the national 
security justification for torture does not suspend the ethics codes of professionals whose 
participation is required.549 Therefore, in order to avoid conflict, proponents of coercive 
interrogation must consider the negative effects that the involvement of health care 
professionals in torture can have.550  
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Chapter Eight: Conclusion 
‘The history of torture seems as long as the history of man.’551 The first people to use torture 
as a definitive military policy were the Assyrians,552 a people dating back to 1900 BCE553 
who used torture to intimidate, control and execute their enemies.554 Whilst the motives 
driving torture as a practice may arguably have changed; for example the Spanish Inquisition 
sought confessions, not information, the actual ‘use of torture follows the same patterns in 
contemporary times as it has in earlier historical periods’.555  
A 1976 CIA observation of Soviet leaders in times of stress found that ‘When feelings of 
insecurity develop within those holding power’,556 they ‘become increasingly suspicious and 
put great pressures upon the secret police to obtain arrests and confessions. At such times 
police officials are inclined to condone anything… and brutality may become widespread.’557  
This theory can be applied to the actions of the Bush administration post-9/11. America had 
just suffered a large-scale terrorist attack, leaving the administration feeling threatened. As a 
consequence, they entered a state of crisis, passing legislation authorising ‘all necessary 
and appropriate force’558 to bring the perpetrators of 9/11 to justice. This mentality, based on 
a perceived need to act in order to regain control, led to pressure being placed on American 
agencies to quickly obtain intelligence beneficial to the ‘war on terror’. Arguably, this led to 
the acquisition of intelligence being prioritised over the moral and legal constraints on 
torture. 
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McCoy summarises that, ‘the powerful often turn to torture in times of crisis, not because it 
works but because it salves their fears and insecurities with the psychic balm of 
empowerment.’559 As the justification of torture is not based upon legality or effectiveness, 
but rather the perceived necessity to act in times of crisis, it is foreseeable that torture will 
continue to be used in response to events such as 9/11, the nature of which serve to blur the 
lines of what is and is not justifiable, thus perpetuating the cycle the torture debate exists in. 
Evidence suggests that the present ‘torture cycle’ continues to threaten the absolute 
prohibition on torture. Current American national poll statistics560 indicate that there exists 
more support for torture than ever before; 60 percent of those surveyed agreed that the 
military should be allowed to use some561 enhanced interrogational techniques to gain 
information from suspected terrorists. As significant as these statistics are in and of 
themselves, when compared with the 2006 BBC poll, in which 36 percent of participants 
agreed that ‘some’ degree of torture was acceptable,562 and a 2014 public opinion poll run by 
Washington Post-ABC News,563 which revealed that 58 percent of participants thought 
torture of suspected terrorists was ‘sometimes or often’ justified,564 they become all the more 
significant; it becomes possible to suggest an upward trend in the public’s support of torture. 
Given the tough anti-torture stance adopted by President Obama over the last ten years, this 
is surprising; the 24 percent increase in public support for torture over this period fails to 
reflect the additional legislation passed by the Obama administration565 and represents a 
significant threat to the prohibition on torture. 
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What is perhaps more worrying than the seemingly inescapable nature of torture, in both its 
historical prevalence and current public support, is US President, Donald Trump’s recent 
comments on the subject. President Trump showed his support for waterboarding and other 
barred interrogation techniques at a campaign event in February, saying ‘[d]on’t tell me it 
doesn’t work — torture works… Half these guys [say]: ‘Torture doesn’t work.’ Believe me, it 
works.’566 The fact that the most powerful man in the world is an advocate of torture and 
perhaps worse; Trump acknowledged that he would ‘bring back waterboarding and… bring 
back a hell of a lot worse than waterboarding,’567 in an interview on ‘This Week’ with George 
Stephanopoulos, is extraordinarily concerning.   
The support displayed for torture at both public and governmental levels make the continued 
practice of torture seem almost inevitable. This, however, does not render obsolete the 
perspectives against torture examined throughout this thesis. The absolute prohibition on 
torture represents an intolerance of the degradation of rights and personal securities of 
individuals, which should be upheld regardless of adherence to it. 
The case opposing torture can be categorised into three main tenets; moral, legal, and 
practical. 
In Veritatis Speldor, John Paul II decrees: ‘Whatever violates the integrity of the human 
person, such as mutilation, physical and mental torture and attempts to coerce the spirit…: 
all these… are a disgrace...’568 This statement aptly portrays the immorality of torture; it not 
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only violates the integrity of the torturer, potentially scarring them for life,569 but also mutilates 
the victim’s body and mind to the point where recovery can take a lifetime.570 
The legal instruments discussed in chapter three make clear the domestic and international 
law’s opposition to torture. Any deviation plainly undermines them and risks the first step 
onto a slippery slope.571 MacMaster asserts that ‘Torture invariably [goes] hand-in-hand with 
a fatal corruption… of the rule of law’;572 as torture is so obviously prohibited by numerous 
legal instruments, any practice of it disregards the rule of law, thus lessening its value. In the 
words of Alberto Mora, ‘Where cruelty exists, law does not.’573  
The main practical argument against torture is simple; it often does not work.574 If, as 
demonstrated by the Senate report on CIA torture,575 torture is ineffective, it cannot be 
justifiable, and as such, should not be practised. Moreover, there is evidence to suggest 
torture actually heightens the threat posed by terrorism;576 creating terrorists and risking 
allied lives via ‘the mobilisation of a violent backlash.’577 With regards to the proposed limited 
use of torture, for example where controlled through torture warrants, the ‘historical record 
suggests that legitimising torture normalises it, making it more, not less frequent.’578 As such, 
any concession made on the absolute prohibition of torture would inadvertently lead to its 
wider use.579 Further, it has been suggested that ‘the legitimisation of torture by the world’s 
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leading democracy would provide a welcome justification for its more widespread use in 
other parts of the world.’580 The political consequence of such a legitimisation would strip 
America of the moral standing to object to, and sanction against, human rights violations 
made by other nations. This would represent a serious blow to the international human rights 
system and the global effort to eradicate torture.581 By way of evaluation, Gross asserts that 
a correctly calibrated cost-benefit analysis must always lead to the same conclusion; ‘that 
torture should not be allowed regardless of any specific context.’582 He suggests that any 
contrary conclusion ignores the long-term and systemic implications summarised above, and 
instead, ‘results from a distorted focus on isolated cases’.583   
Proponents of torture seek to legitimise its practice through citing the necessity defence, the 
ticking-bomb theory linked with citizens’ rights to life, or though proffering the justifications 
provided by the torture memos. Torture advocates further assert that in the case of terrorism, 
states should not be restricted by conventions such as CAT; by choosing to engage in 
terrorism, terrorists have forfeited their rights, and any rights that they have retained, are not 
equal to those of who they threaten.584  
The case supporting torture is, as it is submitted, much weaker than that against it, but that 
is not germane. ‘The fact is, that every democracy confronted with a genuine choice of evils 
between allowing many of its citizens to be killed by terrorists, or employing some forms of 
torture to prevent such multiple deaths, will opt for the use of torture’585 as a last resort. Here, 
Dershowitz cuts straight to the point; regardless of arguments against its use, torture will 
always be employed in dire situations, making it arguably justifiable. 
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Whilst Dershowitz believes that torture is inevitable, and therefore that the absolute ban is, 
as a matter of practicality, unrealistic, ‘there is independent value in upholding the myth that 
torture is absolutely prohibited.’586 Schauer explains that ‘[r]esisting the inevitable is not to be 
desired because it will prevent the inevitable, but because it may be the best strategy for 
preventing what is less inevitable but more dangerous’;587 for example, ‘the expanded use of 
interrogational torture to less-than-catastrophic cases… [Further,] the insistence on an 
absolute ban on torture may slow down the rush to resort to torture practices even in truly 
exceptional cases.’588 Based on this logic, I, like Posner, believe that it is better ‘to leave in 
place the customary legal prohibitions, but with the understanding that of course they will not 
be enforced in extreme circumstances.’589  
I conclude by drawing attention to a passage from Robert Bolt’s, A Man for All Seasons: In 
response to his son-in-law's urging to ‘cut down every law in England’ to get after the devil. 
Sir Thomas Moore replied ‘if you cut them down… d'you really think you could stand upright 
in the winds that would blow then? Yes, I'd give the devil the benefit of law, for my own 
safety's sake.’590 
My response: torture may be justified, not to ‘get after the devil’, not for retribution or justice, 
but in an attempt to save innocent lives. It is hard to imagine that most, with perhaps the 
exception of ultra strict pacifists, would not support torture as a last resort. For example, if 
thousands of lives hung in the balance, with only a remote chance that torture would result in 
them being saved, I believe that the overwhelming majority of people would adopt a 
utilitarian perspective in taking those odds over choosing to do nothing. 
                                            
586
 Oren Gross, ‘The Prohibition on Torture and the Limits of Law’ Torture’ in Stanford Levinson (ed), 
Torture: A Collection (Oxford University Press, 2004) 234-235. 
587
 Frederick Schauer, ‘May Officials Think Religiously?’ (1986) 27 William and Mary Law Review 
1075, 1085. 
588
 Oren Gross, ‘The Prohibition on Torture and the Limits of Law’ Torture’ in Stanford Levinson (ed), 
Torture: A Collection (Oxford University Press, 2004) 235. 
589
 Richard A Posner, ‘Torture, Terrorism and Interrogation’ in Stanford Levinson (ed), Torture: A 
Collection (Oxford University Press, 2004) 296. 
590
 Robert Bolt, A Man for All Seasons (Heinemann 1960). 
 Chapter Eight: Conclusion  
109 
 
It seems, therefore, implausible to support the absolutist notion that torture should not be 
used in any circumstance.591 Montaigne wrote: ‘Nature, I fear, attaches to man some instinct 
for inhumanity’.592 Perhaps this is the ‘inhumanity’ Montaigne spoke of; a predisposition to 
act in desperate times, as the Bush administration and Israelis did before them. 
We too might choose to act, placing us pertinently into the category described by 
McCarthy;593 we might oppose the legitimisation of torture, recognising its abhorrent nature, 
but presented with a scenario as just discussed, would condone its use. As such, it is 
arguable that torture may be viewed as morally justifiable in certain circumstances. Does 
opting for the lesser of two evils label us villains? Is it so despicably inhuman to torture when 
confronted with such a situation? Perhaps not. 
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